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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT.
Resolution A 924 (22) adopted by the twenty-second General Assembly of the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), that was held in London in November
2001, urged the Member Governments of the organization to review “measures and
procedures to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism that threaten the security of
passengers and crews and the safety of ships.” (1) The Assembly further directed the
Legal and Facilitation committees of the IMO to review the “existing legal and
administrative measures, with a view of updating them to facilitate prevention and
suppression of acts of terrorism against ships and port facilities “ (2)
This sparked off intense work by the Maritime Safety Committee of the IMO through
an Intersessional Working Group (ISWG) that culminated to the adoption of a series
of far reaching “measures to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism against shipping.”
(3) This was accomplished by a Diplomatic Conference of Contracting Government
that met in London from 2nd - 13th December 2002. The most important of these
measures were the adoption of the amendment to SOLAS 74 Chapter X1 and the
development of the International Ships and Port Security (ISPS) code.
One is bound to ask questions as to what were the measures to be reviewed by the
contracting governments and was the deficiencies that necessitated the review? ,
What constitutes terrorism and what were the past experiences and responses to
require adoption of new measures? And what are the future prospects of combating
terrorist threats against ships and port facilities?
This dissertation examines and critically analyses the past trends and threats of
terrorism and the responses and measures employed to combat it. The study will also
examine the amendment to SOLAS74 Chapter X1 creating Chapter X1-2 and the
ISPS code and its impact and success in preventing and suppressing acts of terrorism
against maritime navigation. It will further highlight the measures already being
taken ahead of the implementation of the ISPS code and give an overview of the
prospects of the maritime security and the cooperation among states to combat
terrorism especially against ships and port facilities. Finally the paper will give
1

relevant recommendations on the measures required to facilitate cooperation in

prevention, suppression and combating the threats of acts of terrorism against
maritime industry.
Key words – Terrorism, Prevention, Combating, Suppression, Cooperation Risk
management Target hardening and Access.
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CHAPTER ONE.
1. 0 INTRODUCTION
The threat of acts of violence against ships and port establishments is not a
new phenomenon in the history of shipping. Ships have been subject of piracy,
hijackings, violent robberies and other forms of violence since the invention of the
sails. Early incidents of piracy were actually romanticised as “visions of bearded
renegades sailing the seas of endless blue something akin to a maritime Robin
Hood”4. Today’s piracy is a violent bloody and ruthless game perpetrated by
profiteers against victims who are on their own and defenceless and not expecting
any help “just around the corner”5. Whole Crews have been murdered in cold blood
and ships and their cargo lost without trace only to reappear in trade under different
names, flags and crews as phantom ships. The incidents of piracy have been
increasing over the years and are of major concern not only to the International
Maritime Community and IMO but also to coastal states in whose waters the effects
of piracy may be felt or whose ships are attacked.
The international chamber of shipping has defined piracy as “an act of
boarding or attempting to board any ship with the intent to commit theft or any other
crime and with intent or capability to use force in furtherance of that act.”6 This is
indicative that the incidents of piracy, hijacking and robbery with violence against
ships, all have one element in common, monetary gains as the main motivation.
These acts and other such as the pilferage of goods in the port are all incidents of
maritime security. Additionally to these elements are the incidents of the terrorism,
which has of recent has become a major concern to the international community and
in particular to the maritime industry. The threat of acts of terrorism to the security of
passengers, crews ships and port facilities is the subject of this study.
4
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In chapter two the study will attempt to examine the definitions of maritime
security and terrorism. It worth to note that the definition of terrorism has been a
subject of contradictions both to the political leaders and the academicians and this
study will not attempt to solve the impasse. What can be accomplished here is a
construction of an analysis that would explain the features of terrorism in order to
gain a working definition that befits the concept. Kenneth G Hawkes 1989 p4 - 6
constructs two scenarios that can explain the magnitude of the threat of modern
terrorism to ships and port facilities. In the first scenario a terrorist gains access to
the port facility and eventually on board ship using the business card of the ships
attorney based in Boston where the ship has just been moored in readiness for
discharge of its dangerous cargo of liquefied natural gas. The terrorist has taken
advantage of the rush hours of the morning when the inspections at the entry points is
lax and when the master of the ship is confronted by all sorts of service providers
who all require his attention. He therefore stealthily gets onboard the ship with no
one to stop him and gets seated before the ship master who has no way of verifying
the credentials of this attorney during these hours in the morning. The man who has
effortlessly gained access to the ship is not an attorney but a dangerous terrorist and
he has with him weapons capable of levelling a major portion of the port city of
Boston.
In the other scenario the caretakers of an oilrig platform are mercilessly bored
by the routine operation of ensuring that the oil flow properly to the shoreline
facilities and they do not anticipate any unforeseen misshape. However, the platform
is a target of terrorists bent on extortion and the plan is to approach the installation
under cover of bad weather and darkness and take control of the platform and the
people therein. Hawkes concludes that these scenarios would succeed and have been
succeeding for years and are likely to succeed in “today’s maritime void”7
The two scenarios mentioned above have common features, which is the
essence of maritime security. In both cases there is no control of access and therefore
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the terrorists are able get to their targets without being detected. Secondly the
terrorists have approached their targets during their weakest moments when caution
is at its lowest and therefore the targets could not be forewarned and have therefore
become the easy or targets of opportunity. Ships and port facilities are easy targets of
terrorists because of the enormity of their operations and equipment.
The threat of acts of international terrorism against ships and port facilities can be
discerned in at least four main areas. Once the terrorists are on board a hijacked ship
or port facility, they may use it for extortion by threatening to blow it and if it is an
LNG or an offshore installation like the ones in the above scenarios, the state
concerned may need to consider negotiation with the terrorists if there is no other
feasible solution to the problem. This will be more critical if terrorists can hijack a
mega cruise ship with 4500 passengers and crew and demand concessions and
ransom because of the sensational reaction the incident would draw from the media
and the number of lives under threat. Secondly, the terrorists may place an explosive
device in a mega container ship and blow it up in a port facility in an act of sabotage.
They may even blow up an LNG or a ULCC in causing massive casualties and
destruction of the port infrastructures and the port city and causing enormous
environmental pollution which will not only affect the economy of the concerned
coastal state but also could paralyse the international trade of that country.
Thirdly terrorists may attempt to use the ships to transport weapon including
weapons of mass destruction as means of infiltration to a particular country to be
used for terrorist activities. They may even try to infiltrate terrorists themselves using
ships and more so by using containers, which is, the most used equipment for the
modern door-to-door transportation. This has been attempted in the case of Achilles
Lauro in which the Palestinian terrorists attempted to introduce weapons to Israel but
changed their motive and hijacked the ship when they were identified in 1985.
Furthermore in “October 2001 the Italian authorities intercepted a terrorist “stacked”
in a container and destined for Canada with all life support equipment and papers to
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make him have an easy entry to that country as an airport security officer”8. This can
be repeated and there are possibilities that it has been attempted and succeeded
before discovery by the Italian authorities.
Lastly, a vessel can be used by terrorist as a weapon of mass destruction and
rammed into another ship or port facility with disastrous consequences. Terrorists
have already accomplished this during the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 in which
they used a small boat loaded with bombs and rammed onto the warship killing 17
men and injured many others and the recent Limburg bombing in 2002. If such an
incident is perpetrated against a port facility or a mega cruse ship using a gas or
crude carrier and loaded with explosives, the consequences will be unimaginable and
the casualties and destruction will be shocking.
These capabilities are within the reach of contemporary terrorists. Thousands
of ships are sailing in the world seas carrying all types of dangerous cargo
unprotected and susceptible to attacks by terrorists and it just requires one fanatic
with the required indoctrination to cause a serious incident using a vessel as a means
of mass destruction. The suicidal attacks in the United States on 11th September
2001should serve as glaring examples to this fact.
The upsurge of international terrorism will be discussed in chapter three. The
study of maritime security should be seen in the wider context of the general
development of terrorism in the western democracies that experienced various levels
of upsurge of terrorist activities especially during the period between 1968 and 2001.
This has a lot of bearing on the maritime security, as the same western states own the
largest shipping fleets in the world.
This upsurge is closely related to the defeat of the Palestinian cause during
the six days Arab – Israel war in 1967 when realising their weakness in the use of
revolutionary armed struggle the Palestinians reverted to terrorism to advance their
cause. They engaged in aircraft hijackings, hostage taking, assassinations and
sabotage and therefore internationalising the Palestinian cause. They further adopted
8
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the leftist ideologies and gained significant support of the emerging leftist domestic
terrorist groups that were emerging and operating in Western Europe and in Latin
America who professed to fight for the liberation struggle against imperialists in the
third world.
The Palestinians terrorists also sought political asylum in these countries
from where they could organize and plan operations against Israel targets and those
of the Western states that were perceived to support Israelis. These developments
were further compounded by the emergence of state sponsors of terrorism who either
used their agents to further their harassment of opponents or supported various
terrorist groups to attack the Israel and the American interests or to engage in
terrorist activities against their own countries or their rival groups.
Except for the Great Britain that had been experiencing terrorism from Irish
terrorists for a considerable time, almost all the other European states save for the
Scandinavian countries saw an emergence of the leftist terrorist during this period.
These groups were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause and professed to fight for the
down trodden in the Third World and attacked the American and other targets which
they perceived as to represent the western imperialism. They also attacked targets in
their own countries especially the businessmen and the politicians whom they
perceived to sustain an undemocratic and oppressive systems.
The period between 1970 and 1990 saw two significant developments in the
terrorist trends. On the one hand there was evolution from aircraft hijackings and
hostage taking of the late 60s and early 70s to kidnapping and assassinations in the
second part of 70s and early 80s and finally to sabotage during the last part of the
1980s. On the other hand there is abandonment of the extremist leftist terrorism and
adoption of extremist rightist ideology that is evident in West Germany. In Italy the
domestic terrorist activities are more or less subdued during the late 1980s. The
international terrorism however continues into 1990s but it also had undergone
transformation from the earlier leftist orientation to more fanatical and religious
rightist nationalism.
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The other important element to consider in relation to the development of the
contemporary terrorism is the way each western nation responded to the treat of
terrorism. Each country handled terrorist activities in accordance with its strategic
foreign policy interests in case of international terrorism and on the domestic scene
the responses ultimately depended on whether the threat to the fundamental
democratic institutions and the rights of its citizens. It is therefore interesting to
discern the ad hoc manner in which the western nations approached the issue of
terrorism. Terrorists came to take the advantage of the democratic practices, which
assured them of political asylum and established their operational bases in Europe
from where they could organize and execute their activities without fear of being
suppressed by the authorities. Even when apprehended after a bloody attack the were
treated as common criminal and tried under the national laws and sentenced to light
jail terms as one terrorist commented of United Kingdom that,” if one of your
countrymen killed a man in Libya, he would be shot in a matter of days. Here the
assassins know that if they do get caught it will be a jail sentence for ten years. Then
he will go home to a hero welcome.”9
In fact it was believed that the British police were unarmed and in one case it
is asserted as follows; “When the terrorists who seized the Iranian Embassy were
recruited in Iraq, they were assured that the British police were unarmed and could
not harm them”10 However the seizure was dealt with ruthlessly by the British
special forces but the notion is indicative of the factors that intensified the terrorist
activities in the western democracies during that period.
This chapter will also will examine and analyse critically the measures that
were deployed by individual countries to combat the terrorism and their reflection on
the subsequent developments in counterterrorism. It is evident that the western
democracies lacked a common approach to the problem of terrorism despite much
effort being undertaken in the establishment of organizations such as the TREVI for
the European Community and the OAS for the American states. This essentially was
9
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because there lacked a common definition as to what constitutes terrorism and each
state had its own particular interpretation of the problem. The period was the era of
revolutionary movements, which practiced both guerrilla as well as terrorist tactics.
This created confusion, as more often the perpetrators of terrorist acts would claim to
have acted in self –determination against oppressive and racist regimes and were
protected under the exception from political offences.
This problem was further compounded by the emergence of rogue states that
sponsored terrorism under the guise of assisting states to fight against colonial
domination and other forms of oppressions. This claim eventually became the
bottleneck in the adoption of the multilateral conventions that were signed by the
member states of the United Nations and rendered them ineffective in eliminating the
threat of terrorism.
Chapter four will examine the measure both multilateral and bilateral that
were developed during the period preceding the attack on America on September 11
2001 with a view of establishing the deficiencies that necessitated the requirement
for review and development of new ones to facilitate the prevention and suppression
of acts of international terrorism especially against maritime navigation. The
evaluation of these measures has a direct relevance to the new ones being adopted
both by the United Nations, the International Maritime Organization and the other
bilateral arrangements aimed at elimination of international terror.
Since 1960s the United Nations General Assembly has adopted twelve
conventions and protocols aimed at prevention and suppression of international
terrorism wherever committed by whomever and whatever the cause. The key words
in all the conventions are establishment of jurisdiction, prosecution or extraditions of
the offender and cooperation of states in the above endeavours. However due to
pressure from the developing countries and the Eastern block the clause on selfdetermination in inserted and this brought the contradiction as to what should be the
common and acceptable definition of international terrorism. This more than
anything else led to none implementation of these international instruments and the
same fate was to experience with the bilateral conventions. This prompted states such
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as the United States to seek agreements with the friendly countries or undertook to its
own countermeasures to interdict terrorists and took unilateral measures that
included use of military force to protect its citizens from the threat of terrorism.
Therefore the Assembly of the IMO that met in November 2001among other
things, directed the Legal and Facilitation committees to review the existing legal
and administrative measures to prevent and suppress acts of international terrorism
that threaten the security of passengers the crews and the port facilities.
The impact of the attack on the world trade centre in New York and the
Pentagon in Washington DC by terrorists on 11TH September 2001 proved the
unpredictability of terrorist tactics and dynamism. The weapons deployed, the
enormity of the casualties and the precision of the planning and operation were
indicative of the determination of the contemporary terrorists to accomplish their evil
designs. This led to the realisation that ships were easier targets of opportunity than
the aircraft due to the nature of their operation and the cargo they transport and the
enormity of the equipment itself.
The impact of the above attack can be visualised in the intense work that it
sparked off in the shipping industry with the adoption of the resolution 1373 by the
UN Assembly and the resolution A924 (22) by the General Assembly of the IMO.
These two resolutions were the basis of the deliberations of the Intersessional
Working Group that worked throughout the year 2002 to prepare the required
measures to prevent and suppress terrorist attacks against maritime navigation and
port facilities.
The most contentious issues that confronted the maritime experts during the
deliberation of the measures to be undertaken were the concerns of the inspections,
scope of application of the measures, identification the owners of the ships and who
is actually responsible for the recruitment of the crews and the identification of the
seafarers, port facility personnel and the port service providers. The inspection of
cargo was even more critical bearing in mind that already some ports were plagued
with congestions due to low productivity especially in the developing countries. The
USA delegation had already proposed the container security initiative, which was
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subject to much opposition from the industry but was left to the consultation between
the World Customs Organization and the IMO.
The requirement for the identification of the owners of the ships was another
problematic issue in view of the fact that most of the ships are currently under single
company registration in open registries here national controls are minimal. Therefore
the issue “of piercing the corporate veil” was left for the consideration of the legal
committee of the IMO. This issue is still an agenda of the legal committee and
perhaps will deliberated by the IMO General Assembly scheduled for November
2003.The identification of the seafarers was left for finalisation by the international
labour organization in consultation with the IMO.
The identification of the port personnel and the port service providers was left
to the contracting government to handle in their domestic law in consultation with
the ILO and their local trade unions. It was felt that as the measures being proposed
are only concerned with the ships at the interface with the port facility, the issues
concerning shore personnel should be in the preview of the domestic regulations.
The issue of the scope of application for port and the categories to be affected
was left to the definitions in the other regulations concerning the ships engaged in
international voyages and the ports serving them. However there was a dilemma as to
the ships engaged in near international voyages and ports serving the ships on such
voyages. Some delegations from nations with large number of ports including those
that are privately owned like Japan and some European countries felt that there
should be guidelines on this but a compromise was reached that as this may include
even smaller vessel engaged in regional trade, it should be left to the national
authorities to decide in consideration of the magnitude of the perceived threats. The
coastal states were encouraged to enter into regional agreements, if necessary, to
develop guideline on this issue. This will be dealt with in chapter five of this study.
The requirement of the new SOLAS 74 chapter 11 – 2 and the ISPS code will
be discussed in chapter six. In this chapter the discussion will dwell on the provisions
and the requirement of the new chapter and the code and chapter six will look at the
overall impact of the implementation of these provisions. The requirements of the
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new chapter X1 – 2 of SOLAS and the prescription provided by the part A of the
ISPS code brings into the maritime sector a wholly new concept of ship and port
facilities security requirements that is practical in implementation and which would
minimise if not eliminate, the incidents of maritime violence which has threatened its
very existent. It provides the shipping industry and the maritime administrations with
security principles, tactical procedures, management techniques and legal tools that
they should implement not only to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism against
ships and port facilities but also disruption of their lawful and legal operations by the
other forms of maritime violence.
The requirements of these mandatory instruments have placed heavy
responsibilities on the contracting governments and the companies. The governments
have to ensure that the shipping industry is secure from the new phenomenon of
international terrorism by availing the correct and credible intelligence information
as to the terrorist threats and setting the appropriate levels of security in which ships
and port facilities will operate at a particular time. The problem that may arise here is
as to what extent the government bureaucracies will share security intelligence with
the company as most of the government security information is classified and is
based on the need to know basis. Furthermore the security of the ships and the port
facilities will be entrusted on the company security officers and the port facilities
security officers. The issue is as to the capability of these officers in handling the
security intelligence passed to them? The governments are bound to designate a
particular authority to implement these requirements and the problem will arise as to
the experience of the officers that the governments will entrust with these
responsibilities especially in the developing countries.
The contracting governments are responsible for ensuring that a port facility
security assessment is undertaken and a port facility security plan is prepared for
their approval. They are also required to approve the ships security assessment and
the security plan. The issue of great concern again is that whereas the role of the
preparation of the security plans and the security assessment can be contracted to the
Recognized Security Organizations (RSOs) the governments are required to approve
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them by the part A of the ISPS code. This again raises the question of the appropriate
expertise with the governments who are trained in the relevant assignments.
The SOLAS chapter 11 – 2 and the ISPS code are silent on the legal measures
to be applied in case a terrorist is apprehended attempting to get access either to the
ship or the port facility. This is left to the jurisdiction of the contracting governments
to apply the domestic legislation as for the ships that fail to comply there will be
strict measures, it is either denial of entry, detention or expulsion from the port. The
master of the ship is also at liberty to refuse to comply in writing and choose to
bypass that particular port if deems to be insecure for his ship.
The guidelines to the implementation of the chapter 11 –2 of SOLAS74 and
the part A of the ISPS are amply discussed in the recommendatory guidelines in the
part B of the ISPS code. However it is of interest to examine some of the procedures
of the implementation. This will include discussion of some of the control required
by regulation 9 2 of chapter 11 –2and provided for under section 19 of the part A of
the code. Furthermore some developed nations such as the United States, United
Kingdom and other European nations have embarked on the implementation of the
ISPS code even before the date of the entry into force of the amendments. This is in
response to the Secretary General call during the closure of the Diplomatic
Conference on 13TH December 2002when he commented that: “Because of the
worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism, there can be no doubt of the wisdom, for
all parties concerned, of starting to put in place without delay all the necessary
infrastructure, such as the legislative, administrative and operational measures that
will be needed to give effect to the decisions of the maritime security conference. It
is important that this is done methodically and systematically and as soon as
possible, without waiting for the entry – to – force date of 1ST July 2004.”11 Some of
the mentioned have already developed their model ISPS code. This will be discussed
in details in the relevant chapter.
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The other measures that have been taken and the financial implications to
combat international terrorism will be discussed in chapters seven and eight. The
failure of the multilateral initiatives to combat terrorism has led to a flurry of
activities in reorganization at regional and bilateral levels to develop cooperation in
countering the international terrorist activities. The terrorist attack on America led to
the realisation that no country is safe from terrorist menace. After the attack there
developed a fragile coalition to punish the states suspected of harbouring terrorists
but this now seems to be breaking and there is tendency to unilateralism once again.
There are also endeavours to develop capabilities in combating terrorism
especially in the developing countries that have experienced the spill over of
terrorism from the western democracies that had had along history of the
phenomenon. There is further a rush to ratify and implement the existing multilateral
and bilateral treaties and establishment of anti – terrorist special units. Already a
number of countries in the developing world have drafted anti – terrorist bills which
are experiencing a lot of opposition as in case of Kenya and Malaysia and others
There is also the implementation of the contentious Container Security
Initiative that has been experiencing opposition from the Association of European
Ports and the developing countries. There is also the attempts especially in the
United States to involve the shipping community in the implementation of security
measures and programmes to assist the government in prevention of terrorist
activities in the shipping transport.
In these chapters the study will also analyse the financial implications of the
implementation of the measures adopted to prevent and suppress the acts of
terrorism. This involves the strengthening of port security infrastructure and
equipments, port surveillance and patrol and communication equipment training of
port facility security personnel and strengthening of the perimeter defences.
The ships will also be required to install the alert systems and distant tracking
equipment and they will have to strengthen the restricted areas and train the ship
security personnel on board. These are all additional to the already overburdened and
over regulated industry at least in views of the operators. The equipment and the
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infrastructure required is expensive and will be a great burden especially to the
developing countries but the IMO has developed a fund for the purpose.
In chapter nine the study will draw the conclusions and give
recommendations and suggestion for the efficient implementation of the measures
adopted by the international shipping community to deal effectively with the threat
of international terrorism against maritime sector.

13

CHAPTER TWO
2. 0 DEFINITIONS:
There are three concepts that would require definition, as they constitute the theme of
this study. These are maritime security, terrorism and the port facilities. This will
enable us to understand the way they are used and highlighted in the study.
2. 1 Definition maritime security
Maritime security has been defined “as those measures employed by owners,
operators, and administrators of vessels, port facilities offshore installations, and
other marine organizations or establishments to protect against seizure, sabotage,
piracy, pilferage, annoyance or surprise.”12 This can be further considered as
embracing all measures taken to prevent hostile interference with lawful operations
of the maritime infrastructure installations and equipment. The above definition
should be distinguished from maritime safety that has been defined as to constitute
“those measures employed by the owners, operators and administrators of vessels,
port facilities offshore installations and other marine organizations or establishments
to prevent or minimise occurrence of mishaps or incidents at sea that may be caused
by substandard ships, unqualified crew, or operators error.”13
The distinction between the above definitions is clearly that of the nature of
the threats. On the one hand the threats to maritime security are external and can be
countered by development of equally external preventive or suppressive measures
and on the other the threats to maritime safety are internal and can be countered by
improvement of operational standards of the ships and the competencies of the crew.
Furthermore while the incidents of maritime security involve use of violence on the
12
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victims or destruction of infrastructure and equipment, the incidents of maritime
safety involves mishaps resulting from poor operation of the infrastructure and
equipment due to poor structural standards and operations that can be attributed to
human errors commonly brought about by equally poor standards of training and
qualification. Two important instruments provide for last but not the least both
concepts that have been high on the agenda of activities of the IMO. These are the
SOLAS 74 convention for the maritime safety and the SUA convention 1988 for the
maritime security.
Turning to the former definition, it is prudent to make to further distinctions
for the acts reflected as to the two types of threats to maritime security. There are two
key words in the definition that are crucial to this distinction that the words
annoyance and surprise The term annoyance will more often than not refer to
incident that can be anticipated like piracy and violent robbery, and pilferage which
have characterised the history of shipping industry and has persisted because of
human weaknesses in maintaining vigilance and security consciousness on the part of
those charged with the responsibility to do so. Hawkes explains this even more
vividly in the scenarios of the ship sailing in the Phillips channel in Singapore and
the sleepy security guard in the port facility in Seattle. In the case of the ship in the
Phillips channel “the ships radar is functioning but no one pays much attention to it.
The only lookout posted is the able bodied seaman on watch and he is on the bridge
with the mate. ----- Unknown to the mate or anyone else on board, two high-speed
boats are approaching from astern. ------ The master’s instructions are to do nothing,
in case of a boarding, that might antagonise the captors.”14 As to the sleepy guard in
the port facility, “there has been no activity in his area of the port for hours, at least
none of which he was aware. He has become bored with the night, bored with his
job, and bored with the girlie magazine left by the guard he relived hours before. His
only concern and that on which he now focuses all his attention, is staying awake
until the end of his shift. A hundred yards or so away, in a container storage area, the
thieves are at work. They know the port. They come from the rank and file of the
14
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people who work there:”15 In the first case, there will be no resistance because the
industry has chosen to remain so, while it is a known fact that Phillip channel and the
Malacca strait is a pirates infested hot spots. Furthermore those on board are not
vigilant despite this fact and have assumed that “the watch will pass uneventfully.”16
In the case of the demoralised and bored guard, is that pilferage of goods in
the port is a persistent problem and hence the deployment of the guards. However
this particular guard will not detect the crime because he is not vigilant and the
thieves know their trade. Other scenarios can be mentioned but all are indicative that
incidents that cause annoyance are preventable or at least can be detected through
vigilance before they occur. A characteristic common to these incidents is that they
are motivated by monetary gains and will only result to intense violence in
furtherance to this motive.
The concept of the element of surprise denotes incidents such as seizure and
sabotage common with the terrorist phenomenon. Terrorism has leverage in the
element of surprise and thrives on the attack on easy and target of opportunity and it
is difficult to anticipate their occurrences and more often than not they are only
detected when they have taken place. The activities involving seizure and sabotage
are perpetrated by actors with no compunction to use force to achieve their objectives
and are often bloody and excessively violent. These activities are not incensed by
motivation of monetary gains and will most often than not revert to seeking monetary
awards such as ransoms to finance the planning and execution of their plans. This
will be discussed in details under the definition of terrorism.
2. 2 Definition of port facility
The new SOLAS 74 chapter X – 2 has attempted to explain what constitutes a
port facility, as it is critical to the decision as to which assets, infrastructures,
structures and areas should be earmarked for protection but has not offered a clear
definition. This was left for the governments to define after consideration of each
assets vulnerability assessment. However the Maritime Safety committee (MSC)
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meeting held in May 2002 went short of developing a definition when it was asserted
that the port facility security assessments constitutes identification and evaluation of
“important assets and infrastructures that are critical to the port facility as well as
those areas and structures that, if damaged, could cause significant loss of life or
damage to the port facility’s economy or environment.”

17

The terms assets,

Infrastructures, areas and structures constitutes the most important features of the
port facility and are required to be protected. The assets may be viewed as
comprising of the cargo handling equipment, communications facilities and
equipment, boats and surveillance equipment, while the infrastructures would refer to
channel, berths and quays, oil and container terminals, port facility stores and the
perimeter fences. The area and structures may refer to the seaside and the
constructions around the port periphery that although they are not part of the port
facility can be used for attacks on the port and therefore require to be secured.
It is therefore justifiable to define the port facility as that area of the port that
constitutes “those critical assets infrastructures and structures that if damaged, could
cause loss of life or damage the ports economy or the environment.” This would
actually leave out such areas as dockyards and the living quarters of the port
employees. This was left for the consideration of the government in view of their
proximity to the port and whether the terrorists intending to launch attacks against
the port facility could use them.
2.3 Definition of terrorism
Over the last four decades, the international community has not developed a
definition as to what constitutes terrorism that is universally acceptable. Efforts to
define the concept have been hampered by the considerations of as to what motivates
the terrorists to engage in violent acts rather that the justification of the acts
themselves. Most of the definitions especially by the political leadership have been
subjective and based on their ideological orientations and interpretations. It has been
observed that “the definitions are often subjective and self – serving or thought to be
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so by those who oppose the political interpretation they support.”18 The notion of
self-determination and liberation from oppressive and racist regimes has been used
by revolutionaries, state sponsors and perpetrators of terrorism to justify the
unacceptable acts of terrorism. The assertion of “ one mans terrorist is another mans
freedom fighter has not only become a cliché but one of the most difficult obstacles
in coping with terrorism.”19
The notion of self-determination has further led to contradictions as to the
distinctions between the acts of indiscriminate terrorism and the national liberation
struggle. The states that support and sponsor terrorism have often justified their
action by stating that they are assisting the oppressed and down trodden to liberate
themselves from oppression subjugation and occupation. The Syrian president Hafez
Assad expressed this position vividly when he asserted that, “we have always
opposed terrorism. But terrorism is one thing and national struggle against
occupation is another. We are against terrorism – Nevertheless we support the
struggle against occupation waged by national liberation movements.”20 Syria has
been highly suspected of supporting various terrorist groups the most prominent
being the Hezbollah, which has claimed numerous terrorists, acts in the Middle East
and in Europe. The fifth Islamic Summit meeting in April 1987 had a similar
declaration of support for liberation struggle as against the individual or state brutal
and unlawful terrorist activities The conference concluded that “this struggle is
sanctioned by heavenly law, by human values and by international conventions”21
This was in reference to the clauses in the United Nation conventions for prevention
18
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and suppression of international terrorism. The Eastern countries and the third world
nations that were experiencing the process of decolonization pushed these clauses
through the Assembly of the UN. The same became the most difficult obstacles in
the implementation of these conventions but also the cooperation of the world
nations including the western democracies in the counterterrorism measures. It is
evident that this notion still persists despite the fact that most of the liberation in the
third world had subsided by the end of 1980s except for the Palestinian question in
the Middle East. The declaration by the Foreign and Interior Ministers of the Arab
League conference meeting in Cairo in 1998 was even more specific when it was
noted that “the belligerent activities aimed at liberation and self determination are not
in the category of terrorism ------- hostile activities against regimes or family of
rulers will not be considered political attacks but rather criminal assaults.”22 These
statements by the political leaders are a reflection of the notion that the end justifies
the means. They do not explain as to what constitutes the belligerent activities of the
freedom fighters or in that case those hostile activities against regime or families of
rulers. This argument therefore is indicative that even terrorist activities carried out
in the pursuit of struggle against oppressive regimes is justified and should not be
regarded as acts of terrorism and hence criminal. These activities are blamed on the
imperialist who as a former soviet president asserted had no regard for the will of the
people or law of history he concludes that; “Liberation struggles cause their
indignation. They describe them as terrorism.”23
However protagonists of this argument have argued that a freedom fighter
doesn’t kill small children in buses and innocent bystanders or foreign tourists who
do not pose any threat to the perpetrators of these acts. In fact the notion of one mans
terrorist is another’s freedom fighter does not justify the blowing up of buses and
murder of non-combatants as the terrorists do. Benjamin Netanyahu has described,
“this as a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word freedom to be
associated with terrorism.”24 It is therefore, justified to conclude that the arguments
22
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put forward to support the issue of self determination as justified as a political
offence and excepted from criminal prosecution has been the major weakness for the
extradition treaties entered into by the various states in the efforts to deal with
international terrorism and has been used by terrorist to operate and organize their
activities especially in the western democracies where the democratic institutions and
the asylum legislations uphold these principles.
Before an analysis of the various definitions of the term terrorism can be
undertaken it is prudent to make a comparative analysis of the concepts political
terrorism and guerrilla fighters. Guerrilla warfare is more characteristic of the
process of liberation and self-determination and this is the category of action that
should encompass the belligerent activities of the freedom fighters. Traditional
guerrilla warfare is a violent struggle using or threatening to use violence against
military targets, security forces and the political leadership in order to attain political
aims with the goal of eventually removing the incumbent government and replacing
it with a revolutionary regime. Guerrilla warfare is characteristic of rural struggle and
their basic support is the rural population and any indiscriminate attack that would
affect the innocent non-combatants would be their undoing as evidenced in Uruguay,
leading to a military takeover in which the revolutionaries were the losers in 1980s.
In case guerrilla shifts its base to the urban areas in principle it would target
particular urban military facilities or attack specific military or security forces or a
political leader at the level of decision making in order to achieve its political aims.
25

This has however failed and most of the urban guerrillas have turned to terrorism

that has wrongly been referred to as the urban guerrilla warfare. This is actually what
happened to the revolutionary guerrillas in Latin America leading Castro and Cuban
revolutionaries to regard the cities as the “graves of revolutionaries.
On the other hand, terrorism involves intentional use or threat of use of
violence in order to achieve political aims. Terrorism does not have clearly set out
goals and objectives and its targets are undefined spontaneous and indiscriminate. It
entails using violence against a civilian target without the identity of the victim in
25
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order to spread fear in a larger proportion than the affected to intimidate or force
reaction especially in the media. This would further give leverage in forcing the state
or the organization to concede to the terrorist demand. Therefore terrorism is
essentially different from guerrilla warfare in that it mode of activity and the target
choosing are not specific and it specifies a target not done on the basis to influence
decision making but to instil fear in the general For instance seizing the German
embassy in Stockholm in 1986 by Red Army Faction and killing of two diplomats
did not lead to change of the German government stand on no concessions to
terrorists.
It can therefore be correctly argued that by hiding behind the guise of national
liberation, terrorism doesn’t absolve itself from responsibility of its actions.
Furthermore “not only it is untrue that on mans terrorist is another’s freedom fighter,
but it is also untrue that the end justifies the means”. 26 Nevertheless, it happens that
if a guerrilla organization breaks its traditional rules of engagement it becomes a
terrorist organization according to objective of its activities and not according to the
interpretations of the definers.
Terrorism has also been subject of intense debate by the academicians in
search of an acceptable definition. Schmidt and Youngman in their book identified
109 definition of terrorism from a survey carried out among the academic in the
field. They identified several common features, which appeared in most of the
definitions. Some of these features are, recurring element, violence and force,
political fear and emphasis of terror, threat psychological effects and anticipated
reactions and discrepancy between the target and the victim. Others are intentional,
planned and organized action and methods of combat strategy and tactics. These are
characteristics of terrorism as it has a tendency of recurring and inculcates fear by
use of excessive terror and thrive on threat of terror, psychological effects and the
anticipated reaction. Furthermore, It is intentionally planned, systematic and
organized action. It is therefore imperative that an acceptable definition should
embrace all these elements. The US State Department defines terrorism as
26
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“premeditated politically motivated violence perpetrated against non – combatant
targets by sub national groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to
influence an audience.”27 While the list drawn by Schmidt and Youngman did not
attempt to suggest the perpetrators and the victims, the US adds to the terrorists the
state agent to the list of the perpetrators and therefore bringing the issue of states
participation in either sponsoring terrorist activities or being involved in perpetrating
the acts themselves. It should be noted that a number of countries are in the US list of
state sponsors of terrorism and this could have influenced the definition. More on
this will be mentioned later in this chapter as a form of terrorism.
Douglas Kash vol8 has defined terrorism as “an act or threat of act of
violence which targets civilian or property of the state which is intended to inject fear
into civilian population or government or serves as a retaliatory strike and has a
political goal. ”28 While in this definition the element of premeditation is not clearly
reflected and the perpetrators identified, there is an additional element of retaliation.
Professor Kash Further elaborates that civilians include all those at the time of the
attack are not in active military status, who pose no immediate threat or likely
foreseeable future threat. In the former it is not clear as to why there should be
retaliation as most of the terrorist acts are deemed to be unprovoked. It is evident that
the US government has assisted various states in the developing countries in training
of the security forces and provision of equipment for counter terrorist measure and
this been one of the causes of anti US sentiments especially with the terrorist
organization in Latin America but this cannot explain the attacks by Alqaida
terrorists on US targets or the European terrorist groups that targeted American and
other western interests in Europe in 1970sand 1980s. In the second instance it may be
a reaction to the killing of US serviceman during the hijack of TWA 847 in 1985 and
the kidnapping and attempted assassination of US NATO Generals and the bombing
of Le Belle Discotheque in Berlin in 1985 when six American servicemen were
killed and several others injured.
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The other definition for consideration is by Boaz Ganor “Defining
Terrorism”. He defines terrorism as “the intentional use of or threat to use violence
against civilian or civilian targets in order to attain political gains.”
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Ganor is

specific in differentiating the targets that is, the civilian population and the civilian
targets. This may have been influenced by the type of terrorism in Israel where he is
the Director of an institute dealing with counterterrorism. The implication is that
civilians would refer to the general public in the streets and who have been targets of
Palestinian terrorist both in Israel and abroad. Furthermore the Palestinians do not
recognise the Israelis as innocent civilians and have no remorse to kill them as one of
the leaders of Palestinians puts; “as much as we repudiate any activities that
endanger innocent lives, that is against civilians in the countries that are not involved
in the Arab – Israel conflict, we feel no remorse concerning attacks against Israel
military and political elements who wage war against Palestinian people.”30
Therefore the Palestinian terrorists consider all the Israelis as combatants and not
innocent civilians and hence potential targets.
As regards the civilian targets, Israel or any other state would be concerned
with target such as the transport facilities and infrastructures, civilian buildings and
any other structures used for civilian purposes. This may reflect the terrorist attacks
on targets such as buses, trains, aircraft, ships airports and airlines counters,
supermarkets restaurants and business establishments. These have been target of
terrorist activities not only by the domestic terrorists but also the international
terrorists as well. There has been hijacking and blowing up of aircraft, blowing of
buses and trains, attacks of restaurants and discotheques in Paris and Berlin and this
would have a significance in the definition by Ganor as the Israelis have had a long
history of attacks on their civilian targets by the Palestinian terrorists.
Walter Laqueur (1999) offers another interesting definition. He defines
terrorism as “the unlawful use or threat of use of force or violence against individual
or property to coerce and intimidate governments or society often to achieve
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political, religious or ideological objectives.”31 Laqueur goes a step further and
includes the concepts of religion and ideology in the definition of terrorism. This is
because the history of terrorism is characterised by various epochs of religious and
ideological orientations. The Sicari, assassins and the Indian secret societies all of
which practiced terrorism had a religious orientation. During the 19th century the
Russia terrorists and anarchists professed to represent the socialist ideology and were
fighting the establishment to uplift the living standards of the lower classes or the
serfs. The period between the first and second world wars saw an upsurge of right
wing ideology that is broken by the upsurge of the nationalist movements of the
1950s which have more rightist orientation than the left. The left wing became a
driving force both in the nationalist revolutionary movements and by extension to
terrorism in 1960s 1970s and the early part of 1980s and by late 80s most of the
terrorist groups had abandoned the leftist ideology and were either going out of
business like the Red army faction in Germany or most of the terrorists were in
prison and their organizations defeated as in case of the Red Brigade in Italy. From
1990s there is a peculiar upsurge of a mixture of sectarian, millenarian, and religious
nationalism that is characteristic of fanatical fundamentalism that displays some
elements of apocalyptic and pathological orientations. This has featured in the
attacks on the guest workers hostels in 1992 in Germany and the suicide bombing
missions of the Arabs terrorists. It is therefore evident that the contemporary
terrorism while showing traits of rightwing tendencies, has no clearly identified
ideological orientation and it can only be seen on religious and nationalistic basis.
It suffices therefore; to conclude that a comprehensive definition of terrorism
should consist of the elements of elaborate planning, organization and precise
execution, targets should be civilians and civilian oriented infrastructures and the
intention to cause fear and anxiety. The others should include the intended
intimidation of the government or the society and the goals to be achieved whether
31
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they are political, religious or ideological. Terrorism should therefore be analysed in
accordance with its intentions and not motives because its does not reflect any clear
motivations to justify its actions. It has been observed that “motives are entirely
irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism ----- At best they are regularities
associated with terrorism. More often than not they simply confuse the analysis.” 32
2.4 International and transnational aspects of terrorism
After the above analysis of the proposed definition, it is prudent to ask the
obvious question as to when is terrorism considered as international or transnational
and when is it domestic? Professor Martha Crenshaw (1989) observes that;
“terrorism qualifies as international or trans - national when it involves actions in
which the nationality of the victims is different from that of the perpetrators or the
operation is extra – territorially located outside the boundaries of the contested
area.”33 While this description explains the international qualification of the terrorist
groups it does exclude the terrorist who operate only in their countries such as the
separatist groups and those that fight for self determination like the Hamas in the
occupied territories although some of their activities may transcend their national
boundaries. O the other hand the US sees terrorism in three levels. On the first level
are those terrorist organizations that operate primarily within a single country. Their
reach is limited but the modern globalize world their activities can have international
consequences. In this group are the terrorist organizations such as the RAF in
Germany AD in France RB in Italy Tupamaro in Uruguay Luminoso in Peru FAR in
and other terrorist groups in Latin America. In the US we have the weathermen, the
anti - abortionists, the Black Panther and other eccoterrorist groups. In Asia we have
the Abu Sayyib in the philippines The others are the November 17 terrorists In
Greece, Sikh Separatists and Kashmir Separatist in India and many other groups both
around the world. These groups quite often have cooperated with others such as the
Palestinians and have been involved in terrorist activities outside their countries.
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There is evidence of cooperation between the Palestinian terrorist and the Baader
Meinhof in the hijack of the Air France plane to Entebbe in 1976 and the Actione
Directe, and Brigate Rosse and the Palestinians in the attack of the oil Ministers in
Vienna in 1986.
The second group consists of those terrorist organizations that operate
regionally and transcends at least one international boundary. In this we have
principally the Jamaa Ismailiya in Indonesia, The Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, Some
factions of the Palestinian terrorists, the terrorists groups in Pakistan, the ETA in
Spain PIRA in Ireland and others. The last group consists of organizations whose
operations span several regions and their ambitions can be transnational and even
global. In this category will fall the dreaded Al Qaida, the Black September, the FNL
of Algeria The Palestinians and the state supported terrorist such as those from
various Middle Eastern countries that are suspected to use their state agents and
terrorist groups they control to perpetrate incidents of terrorism.
There is evidence of close cooperation between all these groups directly by
sharing intelligence, personnel, expertise, and safe houses. They have and continue to
cooperate in religious and “ideological agenda and reinforcing each others efforts to
cultivate international image for the cause.”34 This was more evident in 1960s and
1970s when almost all terrorist groups were sympathetic with the Palestinian cause
with a leftist ideology and cooperated in executing some terrorist activities for them.
Ganor observes that “terrorism is no longer a local problem of specific countries but
an issue involving a number of international aspects”35 This is more so because
terrorist of today can attack targets in a variety of countries and establish cells and
headquarters in various countries train in diverse camps and can receive sponsorship
from various sources. They can also seek and receive support from communities and
religions and so on. It is therefore difficult to draw a line between those terrorist
groups that are domestic and those that are international.
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The next obvious question should be; who among the terrorist groups are likely to
attack the ships or the port facility? What are their capabilities? Who is likely to
launch the weapons of mass destruction and what is the magnitude of the terrorist
threat to the ships and the ports among other targets? And how can these threats be
combated?
All the above-mentioned groups are capable of perpetrating acts of terrorism against
ships and port facilities the right orientation and rhetorical ideology and equipment.
The cooperation, which is the characteristic of modern terrorist organizations and the
development of modern information technology, has enabled even the seemingly
domestic groups to have an international reach. Furthermore, most of the groups
have trained in Palestinian camps and benefited from their vast expertise and
resources. Also the general anti western mood inherent in most of these groups and
especially among the radical Islamic groups makes them share their resources as well
as expertise and a personnel in organizing and executing acts of terrorism against
western targets and the shipping industry is not an exception.
As regards the capabilities available to the terrorists, they should not be
underestimated. As Paul Wilkinson (1979) puts it “I think we underestimate terrorists
groups if we think of them all as amateur nineteenth century anarchists with bombs
sticking out of their pockets and smoke coming out of their ears.”36 It may be true
that there are still some isolated cases of amateur terrorist groups but most of the
modern terrorist are professionals with vast financial and human resources trained to
handle sophisticated explosive devices and planning spectacular operations. The
recent terrorist operations are indicative of these characteristics. The apocalyptic
fanatism and indoctrination portrayed by the suicide indicates as unstoppable fervour
and commitment to the cause and is another feature of terrorism that cannot be
ignored.
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With the capabilities that are inherent in almost all the terrorist organizations,
every terrorist is capable of launching weapons of mass destruction. It is possible
today than ever for the ingredient of the construction of a chemical to be obtained
from civilian establishments or be stolen from military installations. Furthermore
whereas it may be more difficult to construct a biological weapon the technology to
make a chemical projectile is readily available and doesn’t require expert engineers
as it con be done in an ordinary laboratory conditions.
It is also believed that the state sponsors of terrorism have sought to develop
weapons of mass destruction capability. The states may avail the raw materials or
finished devices to the terrorist groups either for political purposes or for financial
gains. It is noted however that the so called rogue states may not allow access to
WMD to the extremist groups for fear of reprisals in case they are actually used
causing much destruction and casualties. But Laquer has a different opinion, he
argues that, “these weapons may be acquired for deterrence or for political blackmail
rather than with intention of using them. But once they exist it is always possible that
they will be used either in warfare or in surrogate war, that is to say a weapon of state
sponsored terrorism.”37 This therefore means that there are not any inhibitions among
the states sponsoring terrorism that would guarantee non-use of these weapons once
they are in existence. Furthermore the surrogate states may not have control of the
terrorists as indicated by Usama bin Laden when he declared in 1998, “acquisition of
WMD is a religious duty”.38
To combat all forms of terrorism it requires a multi faceted approach. The US
state department in the national strategic plan to combat terrorism is even more
militaristic when it declares that the approach should, “identify the terrorists, identify
their sanctuary and destroy their capability to plan and operate”.39 This approach has
its limitations in that the contemporary terrorist organizations operate in cells that are
difficult to identify and the conspiratorial nature makes even difficult to identify their
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sanctuaries. Their communication system cannot be tapped due to inhibitions
especially in the western democracies where the investigation of suspected terrorists
inhibited by claims of infringements of the human rights.
The National Strategy further indicates that America will focus “decisive
military power and specialised intelligence resources to defeat terrorist networks
globally and with its partners will target the individual states and transnational
networks that enable terrorism to flourish”.40 This statement can be construed to
source of the unilateral actions that have been taken against states like Libya during
the Eldorado canyon Operation in 1986,And the other activities in Afghanstan and
Iraq that are subject of a lot of debate today. President George Bush put it even more
vividly in June 2002 when he said that; “we will take the battle to the enemy, disrupt
his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have
entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.”41 This
statement has a finality of a military expedition of a conventional warfare, which
may not be effective in combating terrorism. Terrorism has defied the rule of the
conventional warfare and hence unilateralism can only lead to political conflicts and
complications that would be exploited by the perpetrators of terrorism.
It has been argued that terrorism is inherently difficult to eliminate because
much of its activities is the work of small autonomous underground factions
attacking targets of opportunity.42 It is therefore suggested that the cooperation
among states should be enhanced especially in exchange of intelligence, enforcement
of international conventions against terrorism, the punishment of the states that defy
the cooperation and the enactment of the relevant laws that would be deterrent to
terrorist activities in the individual nation. Lack of this cooperation especially in the
implementation of the multilateral treaties however has led to frustration of some
states such as the US compelling them to result to military force in order to pre-empt
or retaliate and this can lead to international escalation of conflicts. It is therefore to
40
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conclude that it is possible that the western nations will continue to prefer
unilateralism if the multilateral solutions cannot be reached through the
implementation of the international agreement.
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CHAPTER THREE
3. 0 THE THREATS OF TERRORISM IN THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
FROM 1970 TO 2001
A study of threat of terrorist activities against maritime and port security
would not be comprehensive without consideration of the development of terrorism
in the western democratic nations 1970s. These nations are the leading ship owning
nations and they have some of the busiest ports in the world. Secondly the largest
volume of the sea trade is to or from these nations. Any terrorist activities against
shipping industry will not only adversely affect the economies of these nations but
also their international trade. It should be noted that all the known incidents of
attacks on ships involved ships from the same nations.
The development of international terrorism in the Western Europe can be
understood in relation to two major factor that were at play during the 1950s and
1960s. On the one hand there were the nationalist liberation movement in the former
colonies, which were fighting for independence from colonial domination and on the
other was the defeat of the Arab nations during the Arab –Israel war in 1967. The
nationalist revolutionaries realising the weakness against the stronger colonial forces
were abandoning their traditional rural guerrilla campaigns and embracing Marxist
Leninist leftist ideology and engaging in urban that involved acts of terrorism. On the
part of the Palestinians on realization of the futility of armed struggle against the
Israeli forces they reverted to terrorism and sought asylum in the west European
states where the could plan and execute their operations against Israeli targets and for
those western nations who were seen to be supporters of the state of Israel
These developments should be further seen in the way these nations
experienced the international terrorism, how they responded and how they
cooperated to develop countermeasures to combat the threat. It is noteworthy that
these nations except for United Kingdom that had had a long experience with
domestic IRA terrorism, there was also development of domestic left wing terrorist
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groups in West Germany, France, Italy and Spain which would have impact on the
way each state responds to international terrorism. The legal instrument that had been
developed for combating domestic terrorism became useful in dealing with
international terrorist phenomenon. The only exception to this was the United States
whose domestic terrorist activities were insignificant but it suffered the most from
the international terrorist activities leading to the spectacular September 11th 2001
attack on the world trade centre in new York and the Pentagon in Washington DC.
3. 1

The scope of the terrorist upsurge and threats
All the western democracies experienced various forms of terrorist activities

during the period under review. United Kingdom and Italy experience both domestic
and international terrorism but Italy considered foreign terrorists as not only “villains
however despicable their acts were, but groups with which agreement or compromise
must be possible and from which all parties involved should derive benefits.”43 It had
therefore to contend with the domestic Marxist – Leninist leftist Red Brigades that
had been formed from the young communists in 1970. The RB caused mayhem in
Rome and the industrial towns in the north targeting Israeli establishments and
businesses and the industrial concerns especially those with American interests. At
the instigation of the Palestinians and in George Habbash in particular BR was
involved in the attacks against NATO installations in Italy and attacked pan Am in
1973.In 1981was involved in the abduction of the American General James Dozier in
Verona.44
Red Brigades announced in 1985 that they are joining with the other
European terrorist groups the form a joint front to drive out the American interests
from Europe as they were symbols of imperialism of which the brigade was
established to fight on behalf of the down trodden masses of the third world. The
seizure and murder of Aldo Moro in 1978 and the bombing of a railway station in
Bologna in 1980 could be seen as the beginning of the downfall of the group. By the
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end of 1986 most of the members of the group were in jail or had recanted and by
1987 activities of the group had halted.
Britain had to contend with various terrorist groups especially those from the
Middle East and North Africa but there were also the Basques the Armenians and the
Croats. The Middle Eastern groups were the most active and attacked Israel and
those of other countries deemed to be supporters of Israel. The most notable
incidents are the attempted assassination of Israeli Ambassador in 1982, the seizure
of the Iranian embassy in 1980; the attempted bombing of El Al aircraft at Heathrow
airport in 1986 and the downing of a Pan Am flight 103 at Lockerbie in Scotland in
1988.There were also attacks on the Libyan dissident living in Britain and the IRA
Irish terrorists who had attacked Britons overseas and especially the military
personnel on the mainland Europe.
On the other hand the United States suffered the most from the international
terrorism all over the globe. US citizens were visible globally as diplomats, military
men, businessmen and tourists and hence easy target for terrorists. There were
attacks on American businessmen, diplomats, and soldiers in Latin America by
terrorist groups such as Tupamaro Uruguay, ELN FARC, in Colombia Luminoso in
Peru and others who saw American assistance to their governments as the cause of
the failure of their revolutionary movement. In the Middle East US presence is first
of all seen as the perpetuation of the Jewish state and of recent as a hindrance to
reforms in the Gulf States. In Europe the American presence was seen especially by
the left wing groups as a relic of imperialism and anti American sentiment were
expressed through targeting its interest for terrorist attacks. Terrorist acts against US
national accounted to 21% of the total terrorist acts globally. The most notable
incidents are the attack on the marine barracks in Beirut and the bombing the US
embassy in 1983, the hijacking of the TWA 847 in1985, Attempted assassination of
General Alexander Haig in1971 and the bombing of Pan Am 103 in 1988 among
other. The only incident of international terrorism to take place on the US soil was
the attack on the World Trade Centre in 1993 and brief seizure of the Iranian mission
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in New York and other minor terrorist threats by some Jewish activists and the
shocking one the September 11th attack in 2001
Nevertheless, although there has been an apparent lack of intense anti state
violence in the US, there were some threats of terrorist by rightist groups mostly of
deployment of biological agents this has not posed any significant threat to the
American citizen. The only notable incident was the poisoning of food in
departmental stores in Chicago and the Oklahoma bombing of 1995. However these
incidents are indicative of vulnerability to attacks by weapons of mass destruction by
any determined groups and fanatical elements with missions such as the Al Qaida
terrorists.
France experienced more of domestic terrorism than international terrorist
activities. This was due to the direct involvement of the AD; the leftist terrorist
organization that had been formed in 1979 had concentrated its attacks against
foreign targets. It collaborated with the Palestinian groups in attacking Israeli Factory
in 1982 in 1985 the group assassinated General Rene André an the Director of peace
keeping force in Europe and during the same year joined the other European terrorist
organization in the declaration of the formation of a joint front to attack NATO and
the western European military and industrial targets. The group therefore
concentrated its attacks on the targets such as the NATO oil pipeline agency,
Interpol, OECD, and businesses with South African Interests. Therefore international
terrorism in France had an indigenous origin and the French government could look
aside as long as their activities did not put the lives of its citizens in jeopardy.
France however experienced activities from other international terrorist
groups such as the GIA and FLN from Algeria and the various Palestinian faction
most of whom had sought asylum status in France. These groups were engaged in
terrorist activities targeting foreign establishments but as stated above their actions
were deemed not to be a threat to French national democratic institutions and
therefore they had some degree of operation and protection from the French asylum
laws.
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West Germany and Spain experienced mostly domestic terrorism in form of
the Red Army faction, a left wing terrorist group formed in 1970 in Germany and the
Basques movement a separatist terrorist group fighting form the formation of an
independent Basque state is Spain. Both groups collaborated with the Irish terrorists
and the Palestinian factions through whom the received assistance from the various
state sponsors to advance leftist ideologies. In 1972 the Basques assassinated the
Spanish Prime Minister and escaped into the Basque region in France where they had
been allowed safe haven as long as they do not arouse the Basque nationalism in the
region.
The German RAF claimed to fight for the liberation of the downtrodden
masses of the third world and hence was involved in perpetrating terrorist attacks
against western and NATO and the industrial establishments especially those with
American interests. The group cooperated with the Palestinian faction and other
European terrorist groups both in training and planning for attacks. The most notable
incidents in which these groups cooperated were the hijack of an Air France airliner
to Entebbe in 1976 and the attack on the oil ministers in Vienna in1986. The group
engaged in terrorist attacks on businessmen industrialists and politicians and in 1985
attacked the German embassy in Stockholm Sweden and killed two embassy staffs
but the reaction of the German government was tough and marked the beginning of
the disintegration of the group. By 1987 the group had already abandoned the left
wing ideology and had been replaced by more rightist groups that were more of neo
Nazis than revolutionaries. These groups were instrumental in rising of nationalist
fervours of 1992 when there were attacks on the guest worker in Germany. These
groups were also out of business by the same year when they opted to surrender and
some committed suicide in prisons.
Israel experienced a unique type of terrorism in that the country was
surrounded by hostile Arab states that became the immediate sponsors of the
Palestinian terrorism. Therefore besides the war against terrorism Israel had and
continues to fight for her existence from extinction, which was the major policy of
the PFLP. Due to her policies of the emergency decrees and retaliation against
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terrorist attacks Israel was able to divert terrorism from the domestic scene and
therefore exported it especially to Western Europe. These policies deterred the
population in the occupied territories from cooperating with the terrorists and thus
undermined the areas where they would get sanctuaries and warned the sponsoring
states of the costs of collaborating and tolerating terrorists.45
3. 2

The policies and responses to the upsurge of international terrorism
There were marked divergences in the way the western democracies

responded to the international terrorist activities due to their diverse constitutional
systems. In the US Britain Germany and Israel terrorism was considered as a
common crime in domestic law and could be handled as that except the political
offences that were provided for by their constitutional guarantees of civil liberties In
France and Italy the responses were determined by the national strategic interests and
especially in the former the provision of the asylum in the constitution was sacred.
The Great Britain Prevention of terrorism Act was promulgated in 1974 and Israel
had an anti terrorist decree since 1948. The US dealt with incidents of terrorism by
use of committees system coordinated by the state department until 1984 and 1986
when anti terrorist legislations were put in place. In 1980s and 1990s the British and
German governments reorganised their domestic legislations to provide for
countermeasures for international terrorism while the Italian government utilized the
domestic legal structures to destroy the domestic terror groups while using
diplomacy to accommodate and defeat the international terrorism without using
military forces.46 Mostly the Italian foreign and economic interests in the
Mediterranean region drove this policy.
During this period these states established specialised military and police
units to respond to terrorist activities and especially in the hostage rescue operations
and for the protection of the vital interests that were soft targets for the terrorists. The
Israelis had the First of these units that rescued the Israelis hijacked to Entebbe by
the PFLP and RAF terrorists in 1976 in a spectacular raid that has been described as
45
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to have “served as a unique and outstanding example of both Israeli transnational
antiterrorist initiatives and the efficiency of its military and intelligence services.” 47
This was to be emulated by the other western nation with mixed successes as in the
rescue of German hostages aboard a Lufthansa aircraft hijacked to Mogadishu
Somalia in 1977 and the US attempt to rescue hostages in Iran in 1980.and during the
Achille lauro incident where the US and the Italian forces had a standoff over the
capture of the Palestinian terrorist who had hijacked the cruise ship and killed an
American citizen.
Legislation was modified to reinforce the intelligence community and police
forces to facilitate their effectiveness in handling the counterterrorism activities.
What is evident is the increase of the power of the police in prosecution of the
suspected terrorist and the power of extraterritorial arrests especially the US after the
enactment of the Omnibus or the so-called “Long Arm ” Act in 1986 and also the
introduction of Air Marshal in the air crafts in 1984.Special police armed units are
also established to guard the soft targets such as the diplomats and national leaders
and the airports and the foreign embassies abroad. In Israel the occupied territories
are governed through military emergence decrees that allow the military to declare
curfews and deport or demolish buildings that are suspected to humber terrorists.
These powers meet with criticism from the human rights advocates especially
when they were applied to investigation of domestic terrorism. In Britain the PTA
has been reviewed several times and updated the last one being in 2002 and it still
meets a lot of opposition from civil liberties advocate as inference with the
democratic rights of the British people.
In the US there was resistance to investigations of the Central American groups that
were resident and who were suspected by the law enforcement agencies to be
connected to the communist rebel fighting their governments especially in El
Salvador. It has been alleged as Livingstone puts it that for Reagan administration
counterterrorism served as justification for intensifying domestic political
47
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investigations In Germany even those seeking employment in the public service had
to pledge to defend the constitution and disassociate themselves from terrorist groups
and ideologies.
The police forces in Europe however established central computer data
collection systems pioneered by Germany to track the movements of terrorists and
identify their hideouts. This system was quite successful in Germany and Italy but it
was also opposed as it infringed on the privacy of the citizens but it assisted the
intelligence and law enforcement agencies to identify and apprehend wanted
terrorists and it is today still helpful to the tracking and interdiction of international
terrorist organizations.
3. 3

Negotiations With terrorists and international cooperation.
Except for France and Italy who has a peculiar accommodation with the

terrorist groups and who experienced intensive terrorist activities in their capitals, all
the other western democracies had strong policies against negotiations with terrorist
groups or for that matter, giving in to terrorist demands and giving them concessions.
Italy’s position was reactive and motivated by search for economic peace and
accommodation with international terrorists especially those from the Middle whole
activities were usually reduced after negotiations in which they were accorded free
passage through Italy As for the French government some times it dealt harshly with
international terrorism but on the other hand adopted a laissez faire approach the
gave the groups freedom of movement in France. For instance the notorious
Venezuelan terrorist Carlos conducted most of his activities on behalf of PLPF out of
Paris and was to escape only when he was involved in shooting of French security
men.
The US and Israel have a similarly articulate policy of not according terrorists
benefits of their actions. The US views terrorism as a low intensity warfare and
considers its first line of defence to be overseas in form of information exchange and
diplomacy. It rejects terrorism in all basis since it is a criminal activity that no
political cause could justify Israel approaches terrorism in accordance with the
strategic objectives of encircling the phenomenon from all direction in order to
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destroy the enemy, liquidate its leadership and destroy their capability to organise
and execute terrorist act. The British policy is a firm political will to uphold the rule
of law and to defeat terrorism in this case by promoting national and international
measures to combat the threat by minimizing their rewards and maximizing their
losses. Germany had a similar declaration.
However all these states in various form and degrees negotiated with terrorist
organizations for the best of the strategic national interest and in an endeavour to
bring the hostages home safely and for others for economic peace and foreign
relations. The negotiations led to release of hardcore terrorists and thus perpetuating
recurrence of further terrorist activities and more demands and expansion of
operations. It also public ridicule of the government by its citizens as being unable to
take decisive actions against terrorists to protect its people. The Germany Chancellor
commented after refusal to negotiate with terrorists who had seized the German
embassy in Stockholm that all the authority of the constitutional state will crumble
and we cannot guarantee protection for anyone anymore. Therefore the government
had acted decisively on a matter concerning terrorism. The refusal to negotiate with
terrorism during the Mogadishu saga and the rescue of the plane and the hostages by
German commandos ensured that no further hijack of the Lufthansa was repeated.
As regards the international cooperation there were also a mixture of
successes due mostly to the diversity of the legal system among the western
democracies. The most contentious issues were the requests for extraditions of the
terrorist suspect for trial in the countries who could claim jurisdiction over the acts
they had committed or who require to try them for previous terrorist acts or whose
national had been victims of their acts. There other issue is the punishment of the
states that sponsored terrorism by either directing, financing their operations, giving
the training and weapons and providing them with safe havens and bases from where
to launch their attacks. The cooperation on this issue depended of the foreign
strategic interests of the states under review. The US on realisation that terrorism is
an international and transnational problem sought cooperation with its allies and
friends to pressurise the states that sponsor terrorists to refrain from the practice and

36

if no cooperation is forthcoming to impose sanctions Failure of cooperation resulted
to raid on Libya in 1986 after the bombing of Pan Am aircraft in Rome airport and
the le Belle Discotheque in Berlin which several American soldiers and national
were killed and injured. This is also evident when Libya is again in the bombing of
the PAN Am 103 killing all passengers and crew on board.
The problem with extradictions proceedings arises from the provisions of
exception from political offences in the asylum laws provided for in the constitutions
of most of the states and included in the multilateral agreements against terrorism
that were signed by the Members of the United Nations. These provisions are also
contained in the other bilateral and regional agreements that were ratified in 1970s
and 1980s.it is evident that even the guerrillas who hijacked the Portuguese
passenger ship Santa Maria in 1960 claimed to have acted for self determination and
should not be considered as common criminals but should be accorded exception
from political offence.
Therefore there are rejections of extradiction between France and Italy and
France and Germany and France and Spain It believed that “the revolutionaries were
entitled to use violence to create new order”.48 The French government felt the need
to preserve the French tradition of asylum for the foreign activists. In 1970s the
French rejected to extradict Wilfred Bose who was wanted in West Germany to stand
trial for terrorist activities and instead deported him only for him to command the
terrorists who hijacked the Air France airliner to Entebbe in 1976. The British also
rejected several requests by Italy to extradict nine terrorists until the extradiction
treaty was reviewed and the same was with the extradiction treaty between the US
and the British, which had to be reviewed to allow extradiction of Irish terrorists
from America.
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The other problem that was to be encountered on the international
cooperation was the exchange of information. At first this was hampered by the
diverse attitudes on the protection of intelligence information sources. The
establishment of computer data collection and analysing system solved this problem
especially after the establishment of the TREVI group in Europe in 1977 and the
inclusion of the US after the The Hague meeting in 1986. The cooperation between
the police forces in Europe was a big boost to counterterrorism and especially with
the establishment of centralised data exchange and communication system. This led
to significant decline in the number of terrorist incident from the second half of
1980s and 1990s until the escalation of the present religious Islamic radical terrorism
that will require a change of cooperation to march the ever dynamic renovations of
the terrorist groups and the threat of use of weapons of mass destruction.
The overview of the threat of terrorism above is essential for the
understanding of the threat of acts of terrorism against ships and port facilities. The
responses and the elusive cooperation is critical to the successful implementation of
the requirement of the new SOLAS X1 – 2 and the ISPS code The cooperation is
seen to be elusive because even with the present threat of weapons of mass
destruction the western democracies have not assessed the magnitude of the threat
and develop a common strategy for counterterrorism.
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CHAPTER FOUR –
4.0

EXISTING

SECURITY

MEASURES

FOR

PREVENTION

AND

SUPPRESSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
Since the advent of the modern contemporary international terrorism in 1960s, the
international community has signed various multilateral and bilateral treaties in an
endeavour to prevent and suppress international terrorism. The members of the
United Nations have signed twelve conventions and protocols while the European
Union, Organization of African Unity and the Organization of American States have
signed one each. The UN Security Council and the General Assembly have also
adopted various resolutions urging the member states of the organization to establish
jurisdiction over the offences stipulated in the various conventions by incorporating
them into their national legislations and cooperate among themselves in order to
prevent combat and suppress the threat of terrorist actions wherever they occur,
whatever the cause and by whomever has caused them.
The most crucial conventions for this study are the International Convention against
Taking of Hostages 1979, International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombing 1997 and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 and the Protocol for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf
1988. The issues of hostage takings and the terrorist bombings are the main theme of
the measures that are required by the new SOLAS X1 – 2 and are among the
offences stipulated under the SUA convention 1988.
The International Maritime Organization has also adopted various resolutions and
issued several circulars that are intended to assist the member states to implement the
above international conventions. These will be discussed later in this chapter.
However a short summary of the conventions is essential to establish their relevance
to the study of the threat of acts of terrorism that threatens the security of the
passenger and the crew and the safety of the ships and port facilities.
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4. 1 The International Convention against Taking of Hostages 1979
The International Convention against Taking of Hostages 1979 considers acts of
hostage taking as criminal offences punishable under the customary criminal justice
of the state parties to the convention. The acts are summarised as direct involvement
or complicity in the seizure detention and threat to kill, injure or continue to detain a
hostage, whether actual or attempted in order to compel a state or an international
intergovernmental organization, a person or group of persons to do or abstain from
doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the hostages.49
The requirement for the member states is that each state party to the convention is
required to make this offence punishable by appropriate penalties. Furthermore
where hostages are held in the territory of a state party, that state party is obliged to
take all measures it considers appropriate to ease the situation of the hostages and
secure their release. After the release of the hostages state parties are obliged to
facilitate the departure of the hostages. Each state party is obliged to establish
jurisdiction over the offences of taking hostages.50 Article 4 further obliges the state
parties to cooperate in the prevention of preparation and commission of these
offences in their territories. Under Article 9 the famous notion of self-determination
is provided for. State should reject extradition if the intended prosecution or
punishment is based on the consideration of race, religion, nationality, ethnic origin,
or political opinion.
The threat of hostage taking is very imminent to ships especially the passenger and
ferry ships that are increasingly becoming the popular mode of transport of
passengers and for leisure and in particular the fast growing cruise ship tourism. It is
unimaginable to contemplate a fanatic radical terrorist group hijacking a mega cruise
ship with over three thousand passengers and crew and threatening their lives and the
anxiety and sensation it would generated internationally. These incidents have

49

UN Collection of International Treaties: Conventions against Terrorism; International Convention
against the Taking of Hostages; 1979 New York Articles 1&2 pp207
50
Ibid Article 6

40

already been witnessed during the Santa Maria IN 1961, the cruise ship City of Polo
in 1988, and the famous Achille Lauro in 1985.
4. 2 The Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing
The convention for the suppression of terrorist bombing was necessitated by the
change of operational tactics by the terrorists from the dominantly taking of hostages
and hijacking of the aircraft in the 1970s and 1980s and adopted sabotage by
bombing in the late 1980s and 1990s.It stipulates the offence of terrorist bombing as
“an intentional and unlawful delivery, placement, discharge or detonation of an
explosive or other lethal device whether attempted or actual in or into or, against a
place of public use or a state or government facility or an infrastructure facility with
intent to cause death or serious bodily injury or extensive destruction likely or
actually resulting in major economic loss.”51 Any person who participates or assists
in the commission of the offence has also committed the offence according to the
definition of the convention
The state parties to the convention are required to establish jurisdiction over and
make punishable under their domestic laws the offence described, extradict or submit
for prosecution persons accused of committing or aiding the commission of the
offences and to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings under the
convention. The offences referred to in the convention are extradictable under the
existing extradiction treaties or under the convention itself.52 Incidents of bombing
the ships and threatening to bomb have already been witnessed in the maritime
industry as evidenced by the case of the cruise ship Sanya that was sunk by a limpet
mine off the coast of Beirut in 1973 and the sinking of the coal ferry Nellie by the
Irish terrorists in 1981.53 Recently we have had the bombing of the USS Cole 2000
and the oil tanker Limburg in 2002.
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4. 3 The Convention on Suppression of the Unlawful Acts Committed against
Maritime Navigation and the Protocol on the Fixed Platforms on the
Continental Shelf
The SUA convention 1988 is the only international instrument that has a direct
reference to the acts of violence committed against maritime navigation. It stipulates
the offence as seizure or exercise of control over a ship by any form of intimidation,
violence against a person on board a ship, destruction of a ship of the causing of
damage to that ship, or placing on a ship a device or substance which is likely to
destroy or cause damage to that ship or its cargo, destruction of or serious damaging
of or interference with the maritime navigation facilities, and knowingly
communicating false information. The drafters of the convention endeavoured to
include all the elements that constitute maritime security and mention the threat of
international terrorism in the preamble but not in the text. This is reflected when
recalling the UN resolution 40/61 of 1985 that urges the state parties to the
convention to cooperate with the other states to “contribute to the progressive
elimination of causes underlying international terrorism”54 The states were also
urged to pay attention to all situations “that may give rise to international terrorism
and may endanger international peace and security.”55 These assertions make the
convention lack any new innovations like its predecessors that were rendered
ineffective by the notion of one mans terrorist is another’s freedom fighter. Which
had increasingly become a stumbling block to counterterrorism measures However
the convention attempted to fill a gap in the international law that concerns the
violent acts against maritime operations perpetrated by pirates and the recent increase
of the incidents of terrorist acts against ships and the cases of the cruise ships Sanya
and the Achille Lauro could be cases in reference.
In addition to the offences of interfering with the maritime navigation equipment and
communications and passing of incorrect navigational information which is common
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to the pirates and other criminal acts against ships, the convention covers the
offences as prescribed in the other conventions discussed above making it an useful
legal instrument for combating modern international terrorist threat to the ships and
port facilities. For this purpose the IMO General Assembly directed the Legal
committee to review the existing legal measures and in particular this convention in
order to update it to include the issue of the terrorist activities in its text. This should
be high in the agenda of the next General Assembly to be held in November 2003.
The above-mentioned conventions have not achieved their objectives for the simple
reason that while a number of state parties have ratified them, they have not
incorporated them in their domestic legislations in order to establish jurisdiction over
the offences prescribed therein. Furthermore, even where they have been
implemented for instance among the western democracies there are different
interpretations that render cooperation especially in the extradiction of the offenders
face difficulties due to considerations of other national interests. Furthermore the
motives and the tactics of the terrorists that were prevalent during the drafting of
these conventions and the others have changed so drastically that they will require
complete overhaul to make them relevant to the modern countermeasure to combat
terrorism. The planes that were hijacked for the negotiation purposes now is being
used as a weapon itself, the bomb that was placed in a building and used for extortion
or detonation by remote device is today deployed by a fanatical suicide bomber
whose commitment and mission seems unstoppable and who besides threat of the
deployment, is all the more ready to deploy a weapon of mass destruction.
4. 4 The IMO Resolutions and Circulars
The international Maritime Organization has developed one resolution and several
maritime safety committee circulars to assist the member Government and the
industry to strengthen port and on board security. Resolution A 584 (14) of 1985
directed the MSC and the other committees of the IMO to “develop practical
technical measures including shore side and shipboard which may be employed by
Government, port authorities, administrators, ship owners, ship operators,
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shipmasters and crews to ensure the security of passengers and crews on board
ships.56 The assembly further urged the maritime security committee to take cue from
the marked successes of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in the
establishment of standards and recommended practices for the airports and security
of the aircraft.
This resulted to the development of two MSC circulars 443 and 754 in 1986 and
1996 respectively, that were intended to improve security of ports and the passengers
and crews on board passenger ships and passenger ferries. The two circulars were a
reaction to the Achille Lauro Incident of 1985, urged the member Governments to
develop appropriate measure against unlawful acts threatening the passengers and
crews on board ships by incorporating the proposed measures in their national
legislations and promulgate regulations that could inter alia “provide penalties for
persons attempting to gain unauthorised access to port facilities and persons
committing unlawful acts against passengers and crews on board ships.”57 The
guidelines provided by the above resolution and circulars have formed the basis of
the new SOLAS 74 chapter X1 – 2 and the development of the ISPS code that will be
discussed in the next chapter.
The Maritime Safety Committees circulars 622 and 623 though adopted to deal with
incidents of piracy and armed robberies against ships have some relevant provisions
that are applicable to the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism against port
facilities and maritime navigation. These can be discerned in the elements of
cooperation in the prosecution procedures and extradictions, sharing of the
information on the offenders among the various agencies of the coastal states and the
issue of vigilance to detect intentions of boarding the ships by the perpetrators of
unlawful acts
Also of relevance are the alerting systems that are covered by the early
implementation provision contained in the amendment SOLAS 74 Chapter v
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bringing the date of entry to force by July 2004 together with the ISPS code. The
cooperation between the ships and the Regional Rescue Coordination Centres
(MRCC) has been initiated in the communication of attacks to the shore based
installations and security agencies which can serve the same in cases of terrorists
boarding of a ship on the high seas. Furthermore the installation of deterrent
equipment and lighting systems would deter both the pirates and terrorist alike. The
above circulars and the resolution have largely been ineffective as they lack legal
instrument for their enforcement due to the non-implementation of the relevant
international conventions that would provide the legal instruments for the
enforcement.
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CHAPTER FIVE –
5. 0 THE SOLAS 74 AMENDMENTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT AND
ADOPTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SHIP AND PORT FACILITY
SECURITY (ISPS) CODE
The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York and the
Pentagon in Washington DC on the morning of September 11th 2001 and the
previous attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, reflected two
significant developments in the international terrorism. On the one hand the attacks
demonstrated that geographical separation from the hot spots of terrorist activities is
no longer a guarantee of safety and security of any nation from international
terrorism. The degeneration of the terrorist organization into small and loosely
organized but highly secretive cells and the advantages of the development of
modern telecommunication and information technology have made it easy for the
terrorist cells to communicate their plans without being detected. Furthermore
globalisation has made movement of people easier especially in the western
democracies and the world at large and this has also applied to the terrorists, enabling
them to establish cells in every continent. President George W Bush puts is even
more clearly when he asserts “America is no longer protected by vast oceans. We are
protected from attacks only by vigorous action abroad and increased vigilance at
home.”58
On the other hand, these attack proved the earlier notion that the terrorists are
more interested in publicity rather than mass casualties is no longer fashionable. The
terrorist who fancied seeing “a lot of people watching and many people listening but
not a lot of dead bodies” ceased to exist in 1980s as evidenced by the bombing of the
marine barracks in Beirut and the downing of Pan Am flight 103. The attacks have
ushered in a new era of conflict more bloody and destructive than ever before. Paul
Rodgers of the Infrastructure protection Centre of the FBI explains that “while
terrorists once generally used acts of terrorism as a means to publicise their causes,
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the operational objectives in the more recent attacks focuses on producing maximum
destructions, casualties and impact.”59 The attacks further demonstrated an ambitious
scope

and

dimension

with

consummate

coordination

and

unprecedented

professionalism and tradecraft that kept so large an operation so secret and
unswerving dedication and determination in the execution of the plan. The selection
of the weapons and the target proved beyond doubt that no sector is safe from
international terrorism and more so the shipping sector due the international nature of
its operation.
Following the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York on September
11th many world nations undertook urgent measures to review their security against
terrorist attack. The IMO Secretary General in response to resolution1373 adopted by
the UN general Assembly in October 2001 passed a note to the organizations 22nd
General Assembly meeting in London in November 2001 addressing measures to
prevent acts of terrorism that threaten the security of ships and port facilities. The SG
presented to the assembly the resolution A 924 (22) that had been prepared by the
extra ordinary session of the IMO council that had met a week before the assembly
session commenced on 16th November 2001.The Assembly at the close of the session
adopted resolution A 924 (22) unanimously and made a wide ranging decisions that
would spark off intensive work for the member states of the organization throughout
the year 2002 culmination to the convening of the Diplomatic Conference of the
contracting Governments to adopt a wide ranging measures that had been developed
during the year.
While adopting the resolution A 924 (22) the Assembly urged the member
states to review the existing, and develop new measures to prevent and suppress acts
of terrorism that threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships
and port facilities. It further directed the Legal and the Facilitation committees to
review the existing legal and administrative measures with a view to updating them
to facilitate the prevention and suppression of acts of terrorism against shipping and
port sectors. The assembly also decided that a maritime safety committee
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intersessional working group comprising of all the member states including the
intergovernmental agencies, non governmental organizations and the industry to be
established in February 2002 to prepare and make recommendations on the measures
to be adopted and submit them to the MSC 75 scheduled to meet in May that year.
Therefore in order to make an adequate analysis of the amendments of the SOLAS
74 and the development of the ISPS code it is prudent to evaluate the work of the
MSC intersessional working group that met in February and September2002, the
NAV and COMSAR subcommittees of MSC and the legal and the facilitation
committees of the organization.
5. 1 The Intersessional Working Group (ISWG) Meeting 11 – 15th February and
13 – 19th September 2002
The first IWSG that met at the IMO in February 2001 proposed various
amendments to SOLAS Chapters V Regulation 19 and X1 Regulations 3and 5 to
provide for the installation of the Automatic Identification Systems, (AIS) ships alert
systems, the ships identification numbers and the issuance of Continuous Synopsis
Record (CSR) respectively. The working group also recommended the development
of the International Ship and port security (ISPS) code. The amendments to SOLAS
and the development of the ISPS code are built upon the MSC circulars 443 of 1986
and the subsequent circular 754 of 1996, which set out measures to prevent unlawful
acts against passengers and crews on board passenger ships and passenger ferries
respectively. The former covered the passenger ships on international voyages of
more than 24 hours while the latter catered for passenger ferries on international
voyages. Both were a reaction to the Achille Lauro and the City of Poros incidents,
which involved passenger ships in 1985 and 1988 respectively.
These circulars resulted from the provisions of the IMO Assembly resolution
A 584 (14) that directed the MSC and the other committees “as required, to develop
on a priority basis, detailed and practical technical measures including both ashore
and shipboard measures which may be employed by Governments, port authorities
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and administrators ship-owners ship operators, ships masters and the crews to ensure
the security of the passengers and crews on board ships.”60
MSC circular 443 provided for the preparation and development of the ships
and port security plans and risk assessment of the port facilities and urged the
Governments, port authorities, administrators, ship owners, ships operators ships
masters and the crews, to take “appropriate measures against unlawful acts
threatening passengers and crews on board ships.”61 The circular urged the
governments to put in place appropriate legislation, which inter alias could provide
penalties for those persons gaining or attempting to gain access to port facilities and
persons committing crimes on board ships. The circular further elaborated the
provisions of the port and ships security plans and proposed the designation of the
port facility and ship security officers to develop and implement the security plans
while the government were urged to designate an authority to approve and verify
these plans. It also required the contracting Governments to report incident of
maritime security to the Secretary General of the IMO. The implementation of these
measures should not interfere with the seamless movement of passenger services and
should put into consideration of the provisions of the international law.
The MSC circular 754 was based on an IMO seminar on ferry security held in
November 1993 after the Herald of Free Enterprise incident in 1987 and the loss of
Scandinavian Star in1990 when members urged the organization to consider
recommending development of measures similar to those proposed in the circular
443 for passenger ferries operating on international routes and ports serving them.
The requirements proposed included that the member Governments implement the
measures that are developed voluntarily, need to apply the carriage of vehicles, and
cohesiveness in developing of the measures by the member Governments to avoid
conflicting demand being placed on the ferry operators. The Governments should
further harmonise their measures to reduce the differing requirements placed on the
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ferry operators by different states and that the IMO should set up a Correspondence
Group in order the incorporate the measures recommended into the agenda of the
maritime safety committee.
Circular 754 encompassed all the measures proposed under circular 443 but
introduced the element of the setting up of security levels. It was proposed that “as
part of bilateral agreements Member Governments may wish to agree a system of
threat level notification covering background, moderate, and high levels of threat and
the security measures each considers appropriate for these levels.”62 The circular
emphasised the need for trained responsible officers to perform the duties as defined
in MSC cir 443 and proposed establishment of a security liaison committees in the
fashion of the maritime and port security committees proposed by the first
intersessional working group that met in February 2002. It actually set the theme of
the risk management concept that is inherent in the ISPS code by proposing the
designation of the restricted areas in the port facility, the access control and
identification inspection of passengers and their baggage and screening and also the
control of embarkation and disembarkation.
The two MSC circulars though non mandatory provided the drafters of the
ISPS code with the basic concepts on the roles to be played by the governments, the
designated authorities, the administrations, the companies and the ships masters and
the obligations of each stakeholder in the prevention of the commission of unlawful
acts against the shipping industry and the port sector. The ISWG therefore had no
difficulties in laying the foundation of the work that would occupy the international
maritime community for the rest of the year 2002 but was to encounter several
contentious issues. These were the identification and the background information on
the seafarers, the information sharing between the ships and the port state control
authorities and the issue of ownership and control of ships. Another contentious issue
was the issue of categorization of the ports as well as the ships, which will fall within
the scope of application of the new proposed amendment to SOLAS and the ISPS
code.
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The

various

delegations

both

from

the

Contracting

Governments

intergovernmental non governmental and the industry and notably the United States
delegation, made a wide range of proposals on the measures to improve maritime
security drawing largely from the provisions of the MSC circular 443 for the ISWG
to consider and recommend to the MSC 75. The ISWG adopted these
recommendations unanimously With only minor changes in the text especially on the
issues of the ship and offshore security plans, the port facility security plans
designation ship and port facility security officers, the port and ships vulnerability
assessment the installation of automatic identification systems (AIS), the ships alert
systems and the Continuous Synopsis Records.
The issue of the identification of seafarers was sensitive and required careful
considerations. The US delegation had proposed that a new regulation be added to
Chapter X1 of SOLAS 74 entitled “Seafarers Identification and Background Check”
which would require the “Administrations to verify whether each member of the
ships crew or other persons employed or engaged in any capacity on board a ship on
the business of that ship has been convicted of any serious criminal offence under the
laws of the Administration.”63 The issue of identification document for the seafarers
was unanimously agreed by most of the delegations as essential and this has been on
the high agenda of the International Labour Organization that was considering a
review of the seafarer’s identity document convention 108 of 1958 and the ISWG
proposed that the IMO should approach the ILO with a view to establish a joint
IMO/ILO working group to deliberate on the issue and accelerate the revision of the
convention 108 to facilitate the implementation of this proposal alongside the other
measures to be developed on the prevention of acts of terrorism against ships and
port facilities.
The proposal of the requirement of background check of the seafarers drew
long discussion in plenary as it met with a lot of opposition from the delegates who
felt that on the one hand this would infringe on the seafarers human rights and on the
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other it would infringe of the privacy of both the seafarers and the official company
information. The representative of the seafarers felt that the information to be
contained in the identity documents should be disclosed to the concerned employee.
There was however a general awareness among the delegates that in view of the
structure of the operations of contemporary international terrorism, a terrorist cell
can be introduced in a ship or port facility and organize and execute a terrorist attack
from inside. Furthermore the current research on the issue of fraudulent acquisition
of certificates of competency by some seafarers points to such possibility.
Some delegates felt that it should not be construed that the information
contained in the document is meant for denying any person employment on board
ship or port facility but would rather enable the company or the port facility to decide
as to whom to allow access to sensitive and restricted areas that require to be
secured. It was therefore imperative that a compromise should be arrived at and this
was left to the deliberation of the IMO/ILO working group and the MSC75 that was
scheduled to meet in May 2002. The Secretary General of the IMO however urged
the contracting Governments that while the “details of this issue are being worked
out by the organization and until the solution is reached the confined and solitary
nature of seafaring should be recognised and the crews need for and ability to be
granted shore leave should not be impeded.”64 This was a timely observation as a
number of nations had already introduced stringent visa requirements for seafarers on
board foreign ships that call in their ports.
The second contentious issue was the definition of the owners of the ships
and who actually decides on the employment of the personnel on board ships and
controls their operations. It was the contention of the ISWG that this identification
was essential to establish the person or persons who would be held responsible for
the implementation of the measures being developed for securing the maritime
industry from unlawful acts of terrorism. This proved quite difficult as most of the
ships today are registered under intricate corporate arrangements that involve

64

International Maritime Organisation(IMO)2002 MSC 76/ISWG/4/1 pp4. Measures to enhance
maritime security, (IMO) London 2nd – 13 December2002

51

companies running various other enterprises with the beneficial owners hidden
behind this façade that is difficult to penetrate or what has come to be known as
“piercing the corporate veil”
It was however necessary that a compromise attempt should be adopted to
solve this problem and the ISWG settled for the recommendation for an additional
Regulation 5 to the SOLAS 74 Chapter X1 requiring ships to have Continuous
Synopsis Records on board giving the history of the ship that would include the
registered owner or owners of the ship, who appoints the crews and control the
operations of the ship, and who signs the charter contracts on behalf of the owner. It
was proposed that the Administration should be required to maintain the CRS and
forward it to the next Administration in case of a change of flag and continuously
update it in cases of change of ownership. The company was required to inform the
Administration in case of any changes in the records it holds on that particular ship.
Another element that would pose confusion to the delegates was the sharing
of intelligence information on terrorism between the Administrations and the port
state authorities, flag states and the company and the port states and ships. This is
more so in view of the fact that the information contained in the vulnerability
assessment reports and the ship and port facility plans to be prepared for the ships as
well as the port facilities that were to form the basis of the recommendations by the
ISWG were to be protected from disclosure to unauthorised persons. Furthermore
information on terrorist activities is highly classified information and the
Governments will be reluctant to divulge it to persons not authorised to handle such
sensitive government secrets
This problem was subject to lengthy discussion especially when it came to
the consideration of the controls that were proposed under the Regulation 9 to be
included in the new amended SOLAS 74 Chapter X1. Some delegates proposed that
to resolve this issue it be proposed that a two way track inspection be introduced
where the statutory classical inspection would be undertaken by the authorised port
state control officers while the security inspection should be entrusted to other
officers possibly from the police forces. There also would be the problem as to who
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should be designated as the company or the port facility security officers. The issue
here was as to what qualifications the persons to be designated should possess in
view of the sensitivity of the information they were expected to handle.
There was also concern that was expressed by the shipping industry as well as
the ports on the flow of information on which the declaration of security by the
Contracting Governments and which would facilitate the movement from a particular
security level to another. The information is expected to be credible and should be
collaborated, as movement from one security level would involve additional costs in
form of introduction of extra measures. More often however, the information that can
be gathered on intelligence regarding terrorist organizations and their operations is
usually fragmented ambiguous and often of doubtful credibility unless the terrorist
organization has been penetrated.
Therefore the information that may be passed to the company or the port
facility is of tactical nature to assist them to thwart a terrorist plot and actually to
assist them to establish the first line of defence to facilitate appropriate response to a
perceived or imminent threat. Paul R pillars of US National Security Agency
suggests “that intelligence contribution should be viewed rather in more strategic
sense of which groups pose the greatest threat, which times, and which regions
present the greatest dangers and what targets and what tactics more likely to be
used.”65 Therefore, a compromise had to be reached where there should be a
seamless flow of information to enable the ships and port facilities to more smoothly
from security level 1 to 2 without requirement of external assistance while the
Contracting Government should ensure that the credibility of the intelligence to
require them to move to the security level 3 and the imminence of the likelihood of
an incident be checked before declaration of security at that level. Furthermore the
declaration of security at level 3 should be temporary and ships and port facilities
should operate on it as long as the imminent threat and should change to other levels
as soon as the threat is over.
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There was also the question of the ports that would be subject to the
provisions of the proposed new ISPS code. The adoption of the definition of the port
facilities provide for ships serving International voyages bringing a large number of
ports and terminals within the scope of application of the code. This would
overburden the port and terminal operators and the administration with the wide
range of measures to be implemented and some member states proposed that the
categorisation be based on the outcome of the port and terminals assessment report
that would determine the extent of the threat risks each port or terminal faces.
Furthermore the ISWG was aware that some ports might not have particular
risks and may not be potential targets of terrorist attacks but this notion was treated
with caution for while the terrorist may not target particular ports for direct attack
they may still use such ports for infiltration either of the weapons or the terrorist
themselves as can be illustrated by the attempted smuggling of a terrorist from a port
in the Mediterranean coast in October 2001. It was therefore proposed that the
Contracting Governments, after the vulnerability assessment should consider the
extent of application of the new regulations to those ports facilities which although
they have been designed or are intended primarily to serve ships not engaged on
international voyages but occasionally to receive ships arriving or departing on
international voyages unless the assessment indicate non or negligible risk in these
facilities.
The proposal on container examination at the port of loading also drew
diverse reactions especially from the International Association of Ports and Harbours
(IAPH), the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) and the Association of
European Port and Harbours. It was felt that the proposed inspection of containers in
selected ports would give advantage to those ports and affect the flow of container
traffic in the other ports It would also lead to congestion in ports and affect the turn
round of vessels and increase the costs both to the shippers and the ships operators as
well. This required a compromise trade off as on the one hand there was the concern
of the maritime security against act of terrorism and on the other there was the
concern of the smooth and seamless flow of world trade.
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The threat of containers being used by terrorist organization for transportation
of weapons is real as containers are loaded and unloaded away from port and
transported to the ports for transhipment and only 2% of the containers were being
inspected. While making this proposal the US delegation indicated that “the potential
for use of these containers by terrorists for atrocious acts is very real. Containers can
be used for the transport of weapons of mass destruction or as recently experienced
in a European port, for the transport of potential terrorists.”66 It was proposed that a
container once packed and inspected can be electronically sealed and this may
provide it with a chain of custody as it moves through the worlds transportation
system.
Furthermore it is worth to note that when the ISWG was discussing these
proposals the US customs department was already negotiating with various port
administrations on what has come to be known as the container security initiative and
by August 2002 just a month before the second ISWG meeting in September the
same year twenty major ports had signed the agreement on the container
examination. The issue was however recommended for cooperation with the World
Customs Union and by the next ISWG. IMO had signed a memorandum of
understanding with the organization on the issue.
Except for the few issues such as the installation of the AIS, the ship alert systems
and the application of the new proposed measures only at ship/port interface and the
above contentious issues, the ISWG prepared and submitted the recommendations
for the mandatory amendments to the SOLAS 74 Chapter X1 and the development
part A of the International Ships and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) code.
In summary the ISWG that met in February 2002 made several key
recommendations to the MSC 75. These were, the acceleration of the implementation
timetable for the installation of the automatic identification system on existing ships,
the amendment to SOLAS chapter X1and the proposed international ships and ports
security ISPS code, the requirement of the ships security plan, ships security officers
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and the company security officers. Others were the new requirements for the port
security plan, ship security officers, and the port risk vulnerability assessment. The
ISWG also recommended the urgent review of the seafarers’ identification
documents by the ILO, and the installation of ships alert systems to provide the
seafarers with capability to activate alarm in case of terrorist hijacking.
The committee also proposed to have another attempt at “piercing the
corporate veil” by recommending a desirability of transparency of the ownership and
control of ships and particularly who decides the appointment of seafarers and the
employment of the ships. The inspection of containers that had generated a lot of
discussion during the meeting was also sent to the MSC with a recommendation for
it to be handled by the organization in cooperation with the WCO. Finally the ISWG
recommended the placement of equipment on board ships and port facilities to
prevent unauthorised accesses to the ships at sea and at the ports and assistance
through technical cooperation to the developing countries to build capacity for
maritime security.
The recommendations and the draft ISPS code were adopted by the MSC 75
that was held in May 2002 with only minor alterations especially the wording of the
clauses in the text. An ad hoc working group that met during the MSC 75 session
came up with the development of the recommendatory part B of the ISPS and the
Draft Resolutions to be adopted by the Diplomatic Conference for the amendment to
SOLAS and ISPS code and the other special measures that require to be undertaken
to implement the amendments. The committee also proposed the convening of the
second ISWG to meet in September to deliberate on the part B of the code and refine
the draft measures in readiness for adoption by the conference.
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CHAPTER SIX:
6.0 THE FINAL ACT – THE REQUIREMENTS OF SOLAS 74 CHAPTER X1
– 2 AND THE ISPS CODE.
The main task of the ISWG that met in September 2002 was to deliberate and
finalise the part B of the ISPS code and the refinement of some of the contentious
issues mentioned above. The issue of the identity of the seafarers and the background
information was being handled by the ILO in consultation with the IMO, the
examination of containers at the port of loading was being discussed under an
IMO/WCO memorandum of understanding and the issue of control and the
information exchange had been left for the final decision of the Contracting
Governments. Therefore in essence at the close of the second MSC Intersessional
Working Group meeting in September, the agenda for the Diplomatic Conference
was complete for adoption by the MSC 76 that met concurrently with the conference.
The Secretary General of the IMO at the close of the session indicated that the
session was historical. He asserted that “this had indeed been an historical session
not so much from the viewpoint of the volume of work the committee was able to
accomplish and the thousands of pages of documents it dealt with but more
importantly in respect of the substance of the decision made.”67 The amendments to
SOLAS X1 creating two new chapters X1 – 1 and X1 – 2. The former would be
dealing with maritime safety while the latter would deal with enhancement of
maritime security and the International Ship and port Security ISPS code alongside
eleven conference Resolutions to strengthen them were adopted by the Diplomatic
Conference of the Contracting Governments held in London from 9th to 16th
December 2002
6. 1

Security requirements of the new SOLAS 74 Chapter XI – 2 and the

ISPS code.
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The objectives of the new maritime regulatory regime as contained in the new
chapter X - 11 of the SOLAS 74 and the international ship and port facilities security
code is to establish an international framework for the cooperation between the
Contracting Governments and the shipping and port industries to detect security
threats and take the appropriate preventive measures against the security incidents
that threaten the security of passengers and crews and the safety of ships and the port
facilities. Chapter X1 –2 and the ISPS Code further establish and define the roles of
the respective players in the maritime transport industry. The major goals are on the
one hand to ensure an early and efficient exchange of security information between
the Contracting Governments, the shipping industry and the port facilities serving on
international voyages. On the other hand they provide methodology for security
assessment so as to have plans and procedures to react to the changing levels of
security and to ensure that adequate and proportionate maritime security measures
are in place to respond effectively to these security levels.
In general the regime requires the Governments, the shipping companies and
the port authorities to gather and assess information on security threats and use the
information for preparation of the appropriate security plans to monitor and prevent
among other things, the unauthorised access to the ships and port facilities and their
restricted areas. The other requirements are to prevent introduction of unauthorised
weapons and other incendiaries or explosives to the ships and port facilities and to
ensure that an efficient communication is maintained between the ships and the port
facilities by providing the necessary communication equipment and means of raising
alarm on board ships and the corresponding equipment at the port facilities. Port
facilities and ships are required to undertake periodic drills and training to familiarise
with security procedures and plans.
6. 2 Obligations and the responsibilities of Contracting Governments in respect
of security.
The Regulations 3 and 7 of the SOLAS 74 Chapter X1 – 2 stipulates the
obligations of both the contracting Governments and the Administrations. The
contracting Governments are responsible for setting the appropriate security levels
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and ensuring provision of security information both to the port facilities within their
territory and the ships sailing in their territorial waters and to ships when entering a
port or whilst in their port. The Administrations are responsible for setting the
security levels for the ships flying their flags. The setting of the appropriate levels
should be based on the credibility of the gathered information and collaboration. The
information on the threat is expected to be specific and the threat imminent. These
requirements are bound to meet some shortfalls because the information regarding
the threat of terrorist activities is mostly fragmented and the question of specificity
would be difficult to solve. However, the information that the Government would
provide to the port facilities and ships in its territorial waters or in the port would
facilitate them in Declaration of Security and to operate at a particular security level.
The contracting Governments are also responsible for conducting the port
facilities security assessment and the approval of the port security plans and their
subsequent amendments. It is therefore necessary that the information that the
government exchanges with the port facility is based on the vulnerability assessment
and hence the security plans that are base on the same assessment should contain
measures that could enable both the ships and port facilities to move especially from
levels 1 to 2 without external assistance. At level 3 the ships and the port facilities
should operate according to specific instructions that would be provided by the
governments. For instance when the Government of Kenya declared high alert after
indications of the presence of a wanted terrorist in May 2003 there was a reaction in
the civil aviation industry and some airlines withdrew their services to Kenya
although we have no any information on the reaction of the ships that were in the
territorial waters and in the port of Mombasa.
The Contracting Governments after conducting the risk assessment of all the
port facilities within the territory are responsible for designating the ports that would
be affected by the new requirement and for which a port facility security officers
should be designated. This also applies to the port facilities that although not
designed for serving ships on international voyages but occasionally serves ships
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arriving or departing on international voyages for which alternative measures they
are expected to develop.
The Governments are also responsible for ensuring compliance with the
requirements of the new regulations under chapter X1 – 2/9 of SOLAS and the Part
A of the ISPS code. This would involve a two tier inspection where there will be the
classical verification of safety measure as required by the ISM code and the
additional verifications which will verify the ISPS requirements and the penalties
besides the normal corrective and detention measures may involve a ship being
denied entry into a port or being expelled for non compliance. In both cases the
Contracting Government is obliged to inform the State whose flag the ship is flying
and other states whose ports the ship is expected to make calls.
The contracting Government when it has received credible information of a
threat of a security incident will determine the time and the security level at which
the declaration of security should be required. This would address the measures that
should be initiated in accordance with the provisions in both the ship and port facility
security plans. It should be noted that when the Governments conduct the port
facilities risk assessment they identify the critical assets and infrastructures that if
damaged can result to loss of life or destruction of the port economy and the
environment. The vulnerability assessment would indicate the weaknesses of the port
facilities whose protection is of great concern to the Government and on which the it
would base the declaration of security in the threat is reported or is suspected.
6. 3 Responsibilities of the shipping companies as regards security
According to the X – 2/4 and paragraph 6 of the regulations the role of the
company is to designate the company security officer who would ensure that the ship
security assessments and the ship security plans are properly carried out and prepared
and the plan placed on board ships. The company is obliged to designate ship
security officers for each ship in its fleet and define the role of the masters whose
authority and responsibility to make decisions regarding the security of the ship
should not be impeded by anybody. The company is further obliged to ensure that the
ship security officers and the masters of the ships are facilitated to perform their
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duties effectively and efficiently. It should ensure that the ships in its fleet are
equipped with the AIS and the ships alerting systems
The Company must ensure that the ship security plans are approved by the
administration and contains measures that would facilitate the ships to adjust to the
security levels as may be decided by the Contracting Governments in whose ports the
ship may be intending to enter or are operating in. The include prevention of
introduction of unauthorised weapons and other explosives devices that may be use
against persons on board ships, identification of restricted areas, and prevention of
unauthorised access to those areas. In case of breach of security the plan should
contain the procedures for responding to the relevant security levels and have
procedures of evacuation if necessary. Finally the plan should contain provision for
deployment of the personnel on board ships and have the information as to who is
responsible for the recruitment and the control of the ships business and procedures
for training of the personnel on these plans.
6. 4

Responsibilities of the port facilities as regards security.
While it is the responsibility of the Contracting Governments to ensure that

the assessment of the port facilities within their territories that serve ships engaged
on international voyages are carried out efficiently the port facilities are obliged to
designate a port security officers who will be responsible for the preparation and
implementation of the port security plan. The plan should indicate measures that
would enable the port facility to respond to the various security level that the
Government may set and advice on the declaration of security
The measures include among others the assets and infrastructures that would
require protection, the possible threats to these assets and infrastructures, their
weaknesses and the countermeasures that should be deployed to reduce the
vulnerability. The efficient implementation of the security level 1 is critical not only
to the security of the port facility but also to that of the ships that are served by that
particular port facility.
The terrorists will more likely attempt to get access to the ships or the port
facility from the shore side rather than from the sea and therefore will always try to
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get to the ship either as a stowaway or a service provider in the port. It is therefore
critical that the measures required by the new regulations such as the controlling the
access to the port facility, monitoring the port facility areas including the berthing
and the anchorage areas and monitoring the restricted areas would reduce the
vulnerability of the of the port facility and subsequently that of the ships in the port.
An assessment of security of the port facilities on the Kenyan Coast revealed
that the explosive and the devices used for the attack on the US Embassy in Nairobi
in 1998 may have been infiltrated through a small port facility north of Mombasa
used for fish landings. It is therefore imperative that the plans should put into
consideration such possibilities.
6. 5 The Diplomatic Conference Resolutions.
The eleven Resolutions that were adopted by the conference covered various
aspects that would add wait to the measures that had been adopted. Resolutions 1 and
2 dealt with the adoption of the amendments to SOLAS 74 and the ISPS code and the
date of their entry into force which was set at 1st July 2004.The third Resolution is
very crucial because it gave proposals for the development of the training model for
the ships and port facility security officers, technicians who will work on the AIS and
ships alert systems and long range tracking systems.
Resolution four is also crucial in view of the handicaps that may been
experienced by the developing countries especially in financial and technical aspects
of the implementation of the measure as required by the new security regulation.
Resolution six is more of a warning to the Contracting Governments that unlike the
flexibility that was exercised during the implementation of the ISM code and the
STCW95 the enhancement of security against terrorist activities is of high priority
and the will not be extension.
Resolution seven gives allowance to the Contracting Governments to develop
measure for the port facilities and offshore installations that are not covered by
chapter X1 – 2of the SOLAS74. This would benefit nations with numerous port
facilities such as the European Community and some Asian Countries and United
States who felt that inclusion of all these port facilities would involve the operators
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with extra burden and subsequently this would have been passed on to the consumers
and affect their economies.
Resolutions eight and nine covered the cooperation between the IMO, WCO and ILO
on the contentious issues regarding the container examination at the loading port and
that of the identity and background checks for the seafarers. The tenth Resolution
resulted from a similar resolution by Brazil that proposed development of regulation
requiring ships to be equipped with long range tracking equipment and offered to
donate similar equipment to the IMO as a sample. The issue was forwarded to the
Navigation Subcommittee to deliberate on the technical maturity of the equipment
before it is incorporated into the regulations.
The work of the Conference was recognised by the General Assembly of the
UN and the G8 summit meeting in Canada and the Secretary General of the IMO was
full of praise when during the closing of the Conference he declared “that you have
also succeeded, through the interest the conference has generated worldwide, in
highlighting and promoting the need for the development of a security consciousness
in all that we do to compliment IMOs existing objectives of developing a safety
culture and environmental conscience.”68 The Contracting Governments were urged
to start putting the necessary infrastructure in place even before the date of entry to
force of the regulation in view of the world wide escalation of acts of terrorism.
Furthermore, the future design of ships and the port facility plans will have to include
the security measures that are provided for in the ship and port facility security plans
in accordance with the new regulations.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

7. 0 THE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
NEW REGULATIONS
7. 1 The cost of implementation of terrorism – security measures to the shipping
companies
The maritime security measures that were adopted by the Diplomatic Conference of
the contracting Governments of the IMO is estimated to cost the ship owner a total of
$1.3 billion in additional equipment and personnel and an annual budget of an
estimated $730 million according to OECD report released recently. This is besides
the costs that will be incurred by the port facilities to implement tighter security
measures on the shore side of the ports and the terminal.69
The report quoting a study by a consultant Allen Hamilton indicates that the
maritime transport system is vulnerable to being targeted or exploited by terrorists. A
large attack especially a well coordinated one could have the result of shutting down
the entire system as governments scramble to put in place appropriate measures, the
cost of such an attack would likely be measured in tens of billion of dollars.
Therefore the comparison would point to the fact that inaction would cost more that
this estimates.
The above figures represent perhaps only the Installations of the AIS and ships alert
systems and the recruitment and training of the company and ships security officers
and the familiarization training of the personnel on board ships. The figures may also
cover the preparation of ships risk assessments and the preparation of the ships
security plans, which are the requirement for them to operate at the security level 1.
The ships will be required to initiate additional measures when moving to higher
alert levels and this involves additional costs.
The ships furthermore may be required to install long range tracking system as
required by Conference Resolution 10 that was adopted by the December 2002
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Diplomatic Conference of the Contracting Governments, surveillance equipment to
facilitate the control and inspection of personnel having access to ships, screening of
the cargo and the persons seeking to embark and ships stores to prevent introduction
of illegal weapons and explosive on board. They may also be required to modify the
integrity of the structure of the ships especially the locking systems of the access to
the restricted areas. The threat of terrorism furthermore, may lead to escalation or
introduction of new insurance premiums that have not been reflected in the ISPS
Code. These entail further costs to the shipping companies.
7. 2 The costs of implementation of the new measures to the port facilities
The port facilities are expected to meet the cost of preparing and implementing the
port facility security plans besides the recruitment and the training of the port facility
security officers and the port facility security personnel. They will be further required
to install communication equipment to receive and transmit navigation and security
information to the ships while communicating intention to enter the ports or while
operating in the ports or communicating the Declaration of Security (DS). Where
port facilities are operated by private terminal operators they may be required to meet
the cost of the improvement of the integrity of the port infrastructures assets and
structures that are susceptible to terrorist attacks and which contribute to ship/ port
interface. This drew a substantial discussion during the drafting of the amendment to
SOLAS X1 and the ISPS code especially from the European Sea Ports Organization
(ESPO) who urged the Contracting Governments to bear the cost of the verifications
of the port security assessment and the port facility plans approvals. It also urged the
Governments to take these costs into accounts when setting the levels of security and
declaration of security.70
7. 3 The expenditure by the Contracting Governments
The Contracting Governments have been given a wide range of responsibilities that
will require them to effect huge additional provisions in their annual budgets. The
Governments are required to designate a national authority to implement the new
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SOLAS X1 – 2 and the ISPS code and designate and communicate to the IMO a
contact person or authority that would be available on 24 hour basis to respond to the
communication from ships and port facilities that may encounter security incidents.
They are further required to conduct port facility risk assessment and verify the port
facility security plans. This entails a wide range of training of officers and security
men to familiarise them with the new phenomenon of maritime security against
international terrorism.
The Governments are also responsible for undertaking the risk assessments for all the
port facilities in their territories that serve ships on international voyages and those
although not designed to serve ships on international voyages but occasionally serve
ships arriving or departing on such voyages. They can accomplish this by utilizing
their own expertise or contracting the work to Recognised Security Organization
whose expertise they have to pay for
Where the Contracting Governments are also the port operators, which is
characteristic of most Governments and more so in the developing countries, they
will have to meet huge bills to improve the port facility infrastructure, assets and
structures that are critical to the port operations and susceptible to threat of terrorist
attacks. They will also spend substantial amounts to develop legislative framework
that would facilitate implementation of the SOLAS amendments and part A of the
ISPS code. Lastly the contracting Governments may choose to offer grants to the
port facilities in their territories to facilitate the implementation of the new measures
or guarantee them to acquire financing for the projects to accomplish the same.
The US government for instance, since the enactment of the maritime and Port
Security Act 2002,allocated $104,093,293 as port security grant excluding the port
incident and training funding.71 This allocation was only earmarked for assessments
and mitigation strategies and the enhancement and the operational security. The
government further allocated $98.7 million for maritime security programmes and an
additional $98.054 million for the administration and training by the Maritime
Administration. Another$37 and $ 33 millions were offered as ship building loans
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and for backing new programmes respectively. Furthermore the maritime security
programme would offer the 47 US flag commercial ship $2 million to offset the
expenses for compliance with the maritime security programmes.72
To enhance the implementation of the Maritime and Port Security act 2002, the US
government allocated the USCG $5.9 and $ 6 billions for 2002 and 2003 fiscal years
respectively.73 It has also allocated similar amounts to enhance the operational and
organizational capabilities of the law enforcement and the intelligence agencies to
facilitate the counterterrorism measures. The Department of Homeland Security has
also been allocated Similarly huge amounts of funds for emergency preparedness and
response for the training and the expenses of the first responders in case of any
terrorist incident including an attack on a ship or a port facility.
Other countries especially in the European Union have similar programmes but this
type of expenditure will not be within reach of many Governments particularly in the
developing countries who will either turn to bilateral borrowing or will have to get
their port facilities to adjust their charges and tariffs to meet this new expenditure.
Shipping companies may also have to adjust their freight rates to cover these new
costs.
7. 4 The expenditure by the IMO
Nevertheless, the IMO established a fund amounting to 1.5million pounds to assist
the developing countries in particularly the training and awareness creation to enable
the to participate equally in the implementation of the measures to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism that threaten passengers and crews and safety of ships and
the port facilities.74 This Fund will provide technical assistance to the developing
countries primarily in the field of training especially of port facility security officers
and creating awareness on maritime security among the government officers who
will be designated to implement the maritime and port security requirements. The
actual costs will be computed authentically when the two IMO instruments enter into
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force from 1st July 2004. However the above analysis of the expenditure already
incurred by the United States is indicative of the expectations of the Contracting
Governments and the shipping Industry of the cost of the measures to be
implemented. It is a trade off that has to be undertaken as non-action may be
disastrous.
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8. 1 International response to the September 11 attacks
Following the events of the September 11th attacks in the United States, the
world governments began to reassess their security systems against possible attacks
by international terrorists organizations. They were shocked as Bruce Hoffman in his
article Terrorism and Counterterrorism after September 11th observes, by the “scope
and the dimensions of the attacks, their consummate coordination and
synchronization, professionalism and tradecraft that kept so large an operation so
secret. Also Shocking was the unswerving dedication and determination of 19
aircraft hijackers who willingly and wantonly killed themselves, the passengers and
crews of the four aircraft they commandeered and the thousands of persons working
in or visiting both the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon”.75 The Governments
therefore initiated stringent border control and visa requirements that had negative
impact on the movement and the freedoms of the people including the seafarers on
ships serving on international voyages whose shore leaves were affected.
The year 2002 was a period of intense activities on the world scene as
Governments reviewed their legislations on terrorism and developing new one where
there were none. There was an awakening to the need for cooperation that was
elusive in the period preceding the attacks and there was a revitalization of regional
bilateral and multilateral initiatives to develop the countermeasures against terrorism
and a coalition was formed led by the US to seek and interdict terrorism from its
sanctuaries and punish the sponsors and the collaborators of international terrorism.
There was also a rush by the Governments to develop the legislative frameworks to
facilitate the ratification of the international conventions against international
terrorism and it’s financing. There was cooperation in Identifying and freezing of
financial resources and assets of the terrorist organizations and their collaborators by
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many countries and others were developing the conducive legislations to facilitate
the implementation of the UNSCR 1373 on the same exercise. Many countries
cooperate in the information exchange on intelligence on terrorist organizations, that
leads to arrests and detention of a substantial number of terrorists and disruption of a
their planned attacks and for the first time the world nations attempts to seek a
common understanding as to what constitutes international terrorism.
8. 2 The IMO initiatives
At the IMO work on initiatives had been taken to assist the developing
countries to contribute to the world effort to protect shipping to the best of their
ability and in line with the standards under the elaboration by the organization and
three workshops had already been conducted in Mombasa, Singapore and Sydney
and other were to follow. Furthermore the IMO and the ILO had established an
excellent cooperation on the seafarers’ identification and in accordance with the
commendations if the ISWG had signed a memorandum of understanding with the
WCO on cooperation on container inspections.76
Some Contracting Governments such as the USA and the UK have already
created departments to deal with counterterrorism and had began to implement the
new measures by enacting the Maritime and Port Security Acts and developing their
models of the ISPS code. The EU is also in the process of completing its model of
the code, which it promises to be ahead of the IMO, developed code. The Kenya
Government among other developing countries conducted a security survey of its
ports in October 2002 that has contributed to the establishment of the now
operational Antiterrorist Unit and the Counterterrorism Bill that has already been
presented to the National Assembly for enactment.
8. 3 the container security initiative (CSI)
The most dramatic initiative that has affected the maritime sector however
has been the Container Security Initiative that was developed by the US Customs
Department in 2002. The core elements of the CSI is first to establish a criteria for
identifying high risk containers based on advance information targeting, secondly to
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pre-screen the containers before they are shipped to US ports, thirdly to pre-screen
the high risk containers using high technology and fourthly to use smarter technology
to secure containers.77 While briefing the Senate security committee Robert Boner,
the US customs Commissioner, asserted that the aim of the initiative is to push
outwards and allow customs more to react to potential threat, to stop the threat before
it reaches the US and to expedite the flow of the low risk commerce across its
borders. “Unfortunately, the cargo containers are susceptible to terrorist threat. You
may recall the discovery by Italian Authorities last year in October, of a suspected Al
Qaeda operative, an Egyptian national living inside a sea container. He was headed
for the Canadian port of Halifax with airport maps security badges and an airport
mechanics credentials”.78
The intentions of the US customs are to implement the initiative in several
phases. In the first phase it would post US customs inspectors in twenty-world mega
ports that handle over half of the containers bound for US ports with portable
equipment to work with their counterparts in those ports to identify the high risk
containers and screen them before they are loaded on ships sailing to the US ports.
By August 2002 eight ports in the European Union and others including Singapore
and Hong Kong had signed the CSI agreements with the US customs. This met with
a lot of opposition from the International Association of ports and Harbours and
European Commission as it was deemed to give competitive advantage to a few ports
that would affect the flow of container business between the other ports.
The EC in October 2002 started infringement proceeding against several members of
the Union for participating in the CSI namely the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium
and France but the US customs reacted fast and included eleven more of the
European ports. The argument is that the ports that are participating in the initiative
77

Bonner R. C.(19 – 2 - 2002). - (pp3) Hearing on security at US Seaports. US

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. Charleston, South
Carolina, (2002).
http:/www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/arch
… Retrieved on 17 – 2 – 2003
78
Ibid (pp2).

70

are the traditional hubs that have been transhipment centres for the cargo destined to
various destinations in the world and the CSI is not expected to distort this pattern.
8. 4 The 24 hours rule
Alongside the CSI is the 24 hours rule requiring the shippers to forward
electronically, of detailed manifest information 24 hours before containers loading.
This is being implemented to further improve the identification and targeting of highrisk containers and applies to all carriers in any countries intending to send cargo to
the US. Commissioner Robert Boner, while giving a speech to the Association of US
ports authorities, has termed the 24 hours rule as a matter of national security “24
hours rule requires sea carriers and NVOCCS to provide the customs with detailed
description of the content of the sea containers headed for this country from
Rotterdam or Singapore for the port of Newark, the port of Los Angeles or the port
of Charleston. I want them pre-screened there not here.”79 The containers that fail
the pre-screening will be issued with the do not load directive until their manifests
satisfactorily meet the requirement. This will affect the shipping agencies who may
have to bear some liabilities due to the delays in shipments and the vessels that will
ignore the do not load warnings will be denied unloading containers in the US ports.
The CSI and the 24-hour rule arrangements are reciprocal as other nations
that are invited to post their officer in US port and Canada has taken the lead and has
posted inspectors in the port in US to work alongside their counterparts to verify the
containers crossing into Canada from American ports such as Seattle and Newark.
However this arrangement, though an efficient measure to interdict incidents of
terrorism will affect the container trade in the poor countries that may not afford the
advanced equipment to conduct the rigorous inspections. Furthermore the initiative
will be an additional expense to the shippers who may be required to incur additional
transportation costs while transporting the containers from the quayside to the
79

Boner R. C. (17 – 2 – 2002) – (pp5). Remarks by commissioner Boner to the

Association of Port Authorities, Washington D. C. (2002).
http:/www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/speeches_statements/mar
1… Retrieved on 17 –2 – 2003.

71

inspection centres which obviously will be away from the ship/port interface even at
the transhipment hubs. The electronic or the smart sealing that is expected to secure
containers in the world transportation system may also not offer complete safety for
containers as in case of some ports in Africa whose containerised cargo is transported
by trucks from far off destinations and do not have efficient screening equipment and
hence will fail the manifest details of the 24 hours rule and the pre-screening
requirements as required by the CSI.
8. 5 The Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
The other initiative by the US customs department is the Customs Trade
Partnership Against Terrorism (C – TPAT) in which the shippers and carriers are
expected to conduct a comprehensive assessment of their supply chain security and
take steps to substantially improve physical security, personnel security, access
control and other actions that together strengthens the overall supply chain and
improve the ultimate security of the country’s borders. According to Boner “the
Importers have voluntarily agreed to take steps to increase the security of their cargo
from the foreign docks to US borders. And for their efforts we will reduce their
inspections and other customs burdens. In fact we intend to give companies that
partner with us the fast line across the border.”80 This was on realisation that no
importer or carrier for that matter wants to be the company that brought a weapon of
mass destruction into the United States. The benefits to the US carriers and shippers
are expected to be, as Commissioner Boner adds, “fewer customs examinations,
more predictable deliveries, reduced inventory need, lower risk of theft, lower
transport cost and of course no weapons of mass destruction in the containers.”81
As for the US ports, the benefits will be, efficient container movement,
greater predictability, freed up terminal storage and shorter waiting time at terminal
exits. The above initiatives are actually suitable for the involvement of the industry
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in the development of measures to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism against
maritime navigation and the port facilities as required by the ISPS code developed by
the Contracting Governments of the IMO. In fact the container security initiative is
an advance implementation by the US Government of the recommendation by the
ISWG for cooperation with the WCO that has been working on the examination of
the containers in the multimodal transport.
These initiatives perhaps were undertaken in view of the statement by the
IMO Secretary General in the introduction to the IMO News No1 2003, that
“because of the worldwide escalation of acts of terrorism, there can be no doubt of
the wisdom, for all parties concerned, of starting to put in place without delay all the
necessary infrastructure such as the legislative administrative and operational
measures that will be needed to give effect to the decisions of the maritime security
conference.”82 He urged the governments to do this methodically and systematically
without waiting for the entry into force date of 1st July 2004.“ The last minute actions
could not only play into the hands of the very people these measures are designed to
stop but could also lead to restriction on the movement of ships found not to be in
compliance with the applicable requirements of the SOLAS and the ISPS code.”83
The operational measures have worked very successively as can be evidenced
by the CSI and the C –TPAT and the cooperation that has been experienced among
the world nations in the counterterrorism measures. There however have been a lot of
negative reactions to the development of anti terrorist legislations, which are
necessary for the implementation of the new requirement for the maritime security.
For instance countries that have published anti terrorist Bills have barely pushed
them for enactment due to opposition from the politicians the legal fraternity and the
liberty groups. In states such as the United States and Britain where the anti terrorist
legislations are in place in form of Patriot Act and the prevention of terrorism Act
respectively, the liberty groups have opposed the as draconian and infringing on
personally constitutional rights.
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This legislations though containing some elements that constitutes
infringement of personal freedoms are necessary for the collection of the intelligence
information that will be required by the ships and the port facilities to enable them to
move from a particular security level to another. This cannot be possible without the
enhancement of the investigation capabilities that are provided for by these
legislations. This will require sensitization of the citizen to understand the extent and
what constitutes the international terrorism and the threats it poses to their security.
While developing and executing the security measures whether legislative or
military, the international community should endeavour to seek and eliminate the
root cause of terrorism that seems to be more embedded in social factors than the
political spheres that are subject to the measures that are currently being undertaken.
For instance the elimination of the poverty that is characteristic of the populations in
the terrorist prone regions will discourage the element of the current belief in
martyrdom among modern terrorist if the standard of life in these regions are
improved. This will reduce the tendency of hopelessness that has provided recruits to
the terrorist organizations.
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CHAPTER NINE
9. 0 CONCUSIONS
9. 1 General observations
The preceding chapters of this dissertation have discussed and analysed the threat of
terrorism both to the world nations in general and to the maritime security in
particular. It is evident from the study that the threat of international terrorism is real
and it will be with us for the foreseeable future and it is the role of the international
community to develop countermeasures to combat it and its manifestations. It has
further been revealed by the study that there has been lack of common interpretation
of the concept international terrorism both by the academics and the politicians
leading to different definitions of terrorism and hence lack of common approach in
combating the phenomenon. The study has further analysed the various definitions
and interpretations and the notion of the one mans terrorist is another’s freedom
fighter which capitalised on the concept of self determination and the struggle of the
oppressed people that became and still is the biggest obstacle in dealing with
international terrorism.
It is also evident that there was an upsurge of international terrorism in the
western democracies during the 1970s and 1980s that is characterised by ideological
leftist orientation resulting from the liberation movements and the Palestinian
question in the Middle East. This period witnessed the evolution of international
terrorism from aircraft hijackings and kidnapping to sabotage and suicide bombings
causing much destruction and mass casualties as discerned during the attacks on the
US marines Barracks in Beirut, Pan Am flight 103, bombing of the US embassies in
Nairobi and Dar es Salaam and the attacks on the World Trade Centre and the
Pentagon on 11th September 2001
During the same period the international community through the member
states of the UN developed and signed twelve international conventions and
protocols against international terrorism. There were also the bilateral and regional
conventions that were signed but all lacked the legal framework as the states failed to
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ratify them and hence could not be enforced to prevent the escalation of acts of
terrorism. The failure of the implementation of these international instruments seem
to have been embedded in the different perceptions various nations had as regards
international terrorism and the strategic foreign interests of the affected nations In
fact some nations were ready to look aside as long as the terrorist activities did not
threaten the democratic institutions that are the basis of their constitutions as is the
case with France. Other such as Italy and Greece viewed international terrorism as an
element of foreign diplomacy and sought accommodation with terrorism for mutual
benefits. In Britain, United States, Germany and Israel viewed terrorism as common
criminal acts that should be dealt with under the domestic law. During this period
these nations developed strict legislations to combat terrorism and empowered their
law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute terrorists. They also
empowered their intelligence communities to collect intelligence on terrorists and
created specialised police and military units to respond to terrorist incidents
especially the hostage rescues.
One common feature is that there was lack of cooperation in information
exchange and the extradictions mostly due to differences in security structures and
the definitions as to what constitutes the international terrorism. Furthermore some
felt that extradiction may interfere with the asylum laws that were sacred to their
constitutions and has protected those seeking asylum from being prosecuted for
political offences. Due to foreign policy considerations these nations could not
cooperate in punishing the states that sponsors terrorist organizations. This led to
frustration of some states such as the US who took unilateral action to punish the
perceived offending states.
It is evident however that international terrorism did not threaten the
fundamental principles of democracy and therefore there was no rush to restrict
freedoms for the sake of greater security. Only nations such as Britain and Israel that
introduced full range of powers that was criticised as encroaching on civil liberties.
Nevertheless international terrorism alone was not usually sufficient cause to bring
about introduction of countermeasures that would encroach on democratic processes
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and civil liberties. In fact Charters in The Deadly Sin of terrorism p221 contends
that, “If international terrorism did not prove to be the major distabilising threat to
liberal democracy than many suggested neither did those responses of those states
realized the worst fears regarding the demise of civil liberties.”84 . However terrorism
had destabilising effect in the nations in Latin America where the military overthrew
the developing democratic states and replaced them with regimes that suppressed the
same democracy the terrorists had been fighting for as was the case of Uruguay
During the 1990s there was evidence of an upsurge of rightist radical
religious nationalism that was characterised by the fundamentalism and fanatism
with anti western ideologies that led to the events of the September 11th attacks.
There has been a degeneration of the terrorist groups into small loosely organised
cells, highly secretive and sensitive to their security that they are very difficult to
infiltrate by the intelligence and the law enforcement agencies. These cells have an
intricate system of financial operations that facilitates their operations almost
independently with only little control from a far off authority on the planning and
execution of their acts Nevertheless the financial sources of terrorist activities have
been sought and frozen by various states in the implementation of the UNSCR
Resolution 1373.
The dimensions and the scope of the September 11th in the US and the impact
it had on the international security led to the realisation by the shipping industry that
ships and port facilities are likely targets for international terrorists due to their
vulnerability and the scope of their operations and equipment. This leads to the
adoption of the Resolution A 924 (22) by the IMO Assembly meeting in London in
November 2001 urging the Contracting Governments to review and develop
measures to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism that threaten the security of
passengers crews ships and port facilities. The year 2002 saw intense work by the
members of the IMO that culminated to the adoption of a wide range of measures
that included the creation of a new SOLAS Chapter X1 – 2 and the development of
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the international ship and port security (ISPS) code all of which will enter into force
on 1st July 2004.
The year also witnessed the revitalization of the cooperation that had been
elusive in the past and there is cooperation in the punishing of the perceived state
sponsors of terrorism and the exchange of information leading to detention of a
substantial number of terrorists and disrupting their organization at least for the time
being. Their is also initiation of measures such as the CSI that sought to expand the
US first line of defence overseas by ensuring that all containers destined for US ports
are pre-screened in the ports of loading with the cooperation of the customs
inspectors of the port states and the partnership with the US carriers and the shippers.
9. 2 Recommendations
According to Tom Ridge an assistant to President George Bush on homeland
security the threat of terrorism will be with us for the foreseeable future. “As we
confront it, we must present a unified front to this unconventional enemy. To
succeed, we must stand shoulder to shoulder with all committed nations for in unity
there is strength.”85 This is an all-encompassing statement that depicts the need for
international cooperation in order to develop common approach to the
countermeasures to combat the acts of terrorism. This calls for the evaluation of
individual states foreign strategic interests and international diplomacy to bring them
in line with efforts of the international community to combat the threat of terrorism.
The issue of international cooperation has been quite often expressed in various
forums but the treatment of terrorism has been ad hoc reaction to incidents and
dramatic declarations without unified action. The cooperation should be developed in
the fields of information sharing on terrorist movements and organizations and
formulation of common programmes aimed at combating the phenomenon. The
nations that develop accommodation with terrorist either by negotiating concessions
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with them ultimately jeopardise the security of the other nations that attempt to
develop stringent measures against terrorists.
Cooperation should also be established in the punishing of the errant states
that give sanctuary, safe havens and finance the terrorists in either planning or
executing their activities. This has been the most critical due to differing foreign
policy and commercial priorities among the developed nations. This has led to the
offended states taking unilateral action that have complicated further the
international relations as has recently been evidenced by the issue of American and
British attacks in Iraq. The same was the case of the US attacks on Libya in the
1980s.
The other area that would require cooperation is the capacity building for the
developing countries in developing measures to combat terrorism. It is worth to note
that due to enhancement of the terrorism combat capabilities, law enforcement and
the information gathering technology, the terrorist activities and incidents have
shifted to the developing countries and now we have concentrations of terrorist cell
in Africa and the Far East where the Government efforts the check this
concentrations is often hampered by lack of adequately trained intelligent and law
enforcement agencies. The US Government has been at the forefront at giving
assistance in this field but a lot of cooperation from other developed countries is
necessary both in technical and financial assistance to enable these regions to check
the growth of terrorist cells and bases. There should further be cooperation and
unified approach in looking for the root causes of the upsurge of terrorism and
particularly the settlement of the Palestinian question and the elimination of poverty
in the terrorist hot spots that have been advocated prominently by the Egyptian
president as a prerequisite for solving the issue of international terrorism.
It is also recommended that the international community should establish a
common definition of the term international terrorism. The process of liberation
struggles against colonial and oppressive racist regimes are basically over and the
Palestinian question has been under negotiation since 1990s. The separatist
movements that have occurred in several countries are no longer considered
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nationalist and they are intended to create new states and their activities are not
justified to practice terrorism as it would jeopardised their support from the citizens
the seek to administer if their struggle succeeds.
The Egyptian President Honsi Mubarak has for 18 years since 1985 proposed
an international conference preferably under the auspices of the United Nations to
seek for a common definition of terrorism and look for its cause. In an address to
Washington Post in December 2001 he has been quoted to have asserted that,” with
all frankness I say that what hindered holding of the conference since I called for it
15 years ago was the difference on the definition of terrorism.”86 The definition of
terrorism is crucial since it will among other things the lead to the interpretation of
the root cause of the phenomenon and facilitate holding responsible the countries that
hide behind the concept of self determination to support terrorist activities and
prescribe their penalties collectively. It will also form the basis of ratification and
implementation of the already signed international conventions.
Professor Martha Crenshaw 1989, in her book “Terrorism and International
Cooperation p 158” has observed that the “world nations have available to them
extensive expertise on terrorism much of which is under utilized. This group of
experts goes beyond the accumulation to interpretation of terrorism and explaining
its relationship to national and international security. This can offer comprehensive
and objective analysis of the problem on which multilateral initiatives could be
founded.”87 The international community should therefore enlist the expertise
available to develop a common approach to the issue of international terrorism
devoid of the individual states foreign interests and interpretations of the
phenomenon.
Furthermore the nations of the world should give priority to ratification and
implementation of both the multilateral and bilateral as well as the regional treaties
that have been promulgated since the upsurge of international terrorism in late 60s
and early 70s. These treaties should be incorporated in the national legislations to
86
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facilitate the prescription of the appropriate penalties to punish the suspected
terrorists and suppress and prevent their activities from occurring. In fact the
measures that have been developed to prevent incidents of terrorism against ships
and port facilities will not have any effects if they are not supported by the national
domestic legislation developed by the Contracting Governments who are members of
the IMO and the ratification of these treaties and especially the SUA convention and
the protocol of the off shore platforms and installations. The implementation of these
treaties will also facilitate the development of harmonised anti terrorist laws that will
enable international cooperation in combating terrorism no matter its manifestation.
Finally the Governments should cooperate with the media to educate their
citizens on the dangers of international terrorism. In some instances the media has
been giving the terrorist more coverage than the Governments efforts to suppress it.
This has made it difficult for development of anti terrorist laws as has been
experienced by some countries that have published anti terrorist bills. This is more
critical with the current threat of the weapons of mass destruction. US Government
has created the Department of Homeland Security for this purpose and to prepare the
public for any incident of terrorist attack by maintaining vigilance.
As to the threat of international terrorism acts against ships and port facilities
the governments and the industry should take the warning of the chairman of the
ISWG Mr Wall who advised that the “idea that the code will not be strictly
implemented next year are unfounded companies must stop pretending and start
implementing as the enforcement of the code will be stringent.”88 Despite this
misconception many companies and ports have begun to implement the requirements
and there should be no confusion between the commercial interests and the security
of maritime navigation and the ports. The earlier implementation of these measures
will reveal the difficulties that may be inherent in the ISPS code and highlight them
before they can affect the movement of the ships when the code and the SOLAS
amendments finally come to force in July 2004

88
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The future cooperation on combating international terrorism may ultimately
depend on an interaction between the bilateral and multilateral initiatives as well as
the domestic efforts in intelligence gathering and sharing and development of
common approach especially now that the threat of deployment of weapons of mass
destruction is plausible and imminent. Efforts should be directed at isolating the
terrorist activities to a particular region or State and then all resources national,
regional as well internationally to eliminate the threat. Anti terrorist legislations
should be enacted especially in the terrorist hot spots but control should be initiated
to ensure that they are not misused by the law enforcement agencies.
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APPENDIX 1

AMENDMENT

TO

THE

ANNEX

TO

THE

INTERNATIONAL

CONVENTION FOR THE SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, 1974 AS AMENDED

CHAPTER V
SAFETY OF NAVIGATION

Regulation 19 – Carriage requirement for shipboard navigational systems and
equipment
1

The existing subparagraphs .4, .5 and .6of paragraph 2.4.2 are replaced by the
following

.
“. 4 in case of ships, other than passenger ships and tankers of 300 gross tonnage
and upward but less than 50,000 gross tonnage not later than the first equipment
survey after 1 July 2004 or by 31 December 2004, whichever is earlier, and”
2 The following new sentence is added at the end of the existing subparagraph 7
of paragraph 2.4:
“Ships fitted with AIS shall maintain in operation at all times except where
international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of
navigational information.”
CHAPTER X1
SPECIAL MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY
3 The existing chapter X1 is renumbered as chapter X1 – 1
Regulation 3 – Ship identification number
4 The following text is inserted after the title of the regulation:
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“(Paragraphs 4 and 5 apply to all ships to which this regulation applies. For the
ships constructed before [1 July 2004] the requirements of paragraphs 4 and 5
shall be complied with not later than the first scheduled dry - docking of the ship
after [1 JULY 2004]”
5 The existing paragraph 4 is deleted and new text is inserted:
“4The ships identification numbers shall be permanently marked
.1 in a visible place either on the stern of the ship or on either side of the hull
amid - ship port or starboard above the deepest assigned load line or either
side of the superstructure port or on starboard or on the front of the
superstructure or in the case of passenger ships, on a horizontal surface
visible from the air and:
.2 in an easily accessible place either on one of the end transverse bulkheads
of the machinery places as defined in regulation II –2/3. 41 or on the
hatchway or in the case of tankers, in the pump room or in the case of ship
with ro – ro spaces as defined in regulation II – 2/3.41on one of the end
transverse bulkheads of the ro – ro spaces.
5 The permanent markings shall be plainly visible, clear of any other
markings on the hull and shall be panted in a contrasting colour.
5.1 The permanent markings referred to in paragraph 4.1 shall be less than
200 mm in height. The permanent markings referred to in paragraph 4.2
shall not be less than 100 mm in height. The width of the marks shall be
proportionate to the height.
5.2 The permanent markings may be made by raised lettering or by cutting it
in or by centre punching it or by any other equivalent method of marking
the ship identification number which ensures that the marking is not
easily expunged.
5.3 On the ships constructed of material other that steel or metal, the
administration shall approve the method of marking the ships
identification numbers.
6 The following new regulation 5 is added after the existing regulation 4
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Regulation 5
Continuous Synopsis Record
1 Every ship to which chapter 1 applies shall be issued with a continuous synopsis
record
2.1The Continuous Synopsis Record is intended to provide an on board record of the
history of the ship with respect to the information recorded therein.
2.2For ships constructed before 1st July 2004 the Continuous Synopsis Record shall,
shall at least provide history of the ship as from 1st July 2004
3 The Continuous Synopsis Record shall be issued by the Administration to each
ship that is entitled to fly its flag and it shall contain at least the following
information:
.1 the name of the state whose flag the ship is entitled to fly;
.2 the date on which the ship was registered with that state
.3 the ships identification number in accordance with regulation 3;
.4 the name of the ship;
.5 the port at which the ship is registered;
.6 the name of the registered owner(s) and their registered address (es);
.7 the name of the bareboat charterer (s) and their registered address (es), if
applicable;
.8 the name of the company, as defined in regulation 1X/1, its registered address and
the address (es) from where it carries out the safety management activities;
.9 the name of the classification society (ies) with which the ship is classed;
.10 the name if the Administration or Contracting Government or of the recognised
organization which has issued the Document of Compliance (or Interim Document of
Compliance) specified in the ISM code as defined in regulation 1X/1, to the
company operating the ship and the name of the body which carries out the audit on
the basis on which the document, if other than that issuing the document;
.11 the name of the Administration or Contracting Government or the recognised
organization that issued the Safe Management Certificate (or interim Safety
Management Certificate) specified in the ISM code as defined in regulation1X/1 to
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the ship and the name of the body which has carried out the audit on the basis of
which the certificate was issued, if other that that issuing the certificate;
.12 the name of the Administration or of the Contracting Government or of the
recognised security organization that has issued the International Ship Security
Certificate (or an Interim Ship Security Certificate) as specified I part A of the ISPS
code as defined iregulationX1 – 2/1 to the ship and the name of the body which has
carried out the verification on the basis on which the certificate was issued, if other
than that issuing the certificate and
.13 the date on which the ship ceases to be registered with that state.
4.1 Any changes relating to the entries referred to in paragraphs 3.4 to 3.12 shall be
recorded in the Continuous Synopsis Record so as to provide updated and current
information together with the history of the changes.
4.2 In case of any changes relating to the entries referred to in paragraph 4.1 the
Administration shall issue, as soon as is practically possible but not later than three
months from the date of the change, to the ship entitled to fly its flag either a revised
and updated version of the Continuous Synopsis record or appropriate amendments
thereto.
4.3 In case of any changes relating to the entries referred to in paragraph 4.1,the
Administration, pending the issue of a revised and updated version of the Continuous
Synopsis Record, shall authorise and require either the company as defined in
regulation 1X/1 or the master of the ship to amend the Continuous Synopsis Record
to reflect the changes. In such cases, after the Continuous Synopsis Record has been
amended the company shall without delay, inform the Administration accordingly.
5.1 The Continuous Synopsis Record shall be in English, French or Spanish
language. Additionally, a translation of the Continuous Synopsis Record into the
official language or languages of the Administration may be provided.
5.2 The Continuous Synopsis Record shall be in the format developed by the
Organization and shall be maintained in accordance with the guidelines
developed by the Organization. Any previous entries in the Continuous Synopsis
Record shall not be modified, deleted or in any way erased or defaced.
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6 Whenever a ship is to be transferred to the flag of another state or the ship is sold to
another owner (or is take over by another bareboat charterer) or another company
assumes responsibility for operation of the ship the Continuous Synopsis Record
shall be left on board.
7 When a ship is to be transferred to the flag of another state, the company shall
notify the Administration of the name of the state under whose flag the ship is to be
transferred so as to enable the Administration to forward to that state a copy of the
Continuous Synopsis Record covering the period during which the ship under their
jurisdiction.
8 When a ship is transferred to the flag of another state the Government of which
is a Contracting Government, the Contracting Government of the state whose flag the
ship was flying hitherto shall transmit to the Administration as soon as possible after
the transfer takes place a copy of the relevant Continuous Synopsis Record covering
the period during which the was under their jurisdiction and together with any
Continuous Synopsis Record previously issued to the ship by other states.
9 When the ship is transferred to the flag of another state, the Administration
shall append the previous Continuous synopsis Record the Continuous Synopsis
Record the Administration will issue to the ship so as to provide the continuous
history record intended by this regulation.
10 The continuous Synopsis Record shall be kept on board the ship and shall
be availed for inspection at all times.
7 The following new chapterX1 – 2 is inserted after the renumbered chapter X1 – 1:

CHAPTER X1 –2
SPECIAL MEASURES TO ENHANCE MARITIME SECURITY
Regulation 1 – Definitions
.1 Bulk carrier means a bulk carrier as defined in regulation 1X/1.6
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.2Chemical tanker means a chemical tanker as defined in regulation V11/8.
.3Gas carrier means a gas carrier as defined in regulationV11/11.2
.4 High speed craft means a craft as defined in regulationX/1.2
.5 mobile offshore drilling unit means a mechanically propelled drilling unit,
as defined in regulationX/1 not on location.
.6Oil tanker means an oil tanker as defined in regulation 11 –1/ 2.12
.7 Company means a company as defined in regulation 1X/1
.8 Ship/port interface means the interaction that occur when a ship is directly
and immediately affected by actions involving the movements of persons, goods or
the provision of port services to or from the ship.
.9 Port facility is a location, as determined by the Contracting Government or
by the designated authority, where the ship/port interface takes place. This includes
areas such as anchorages, waiting berths and approaches from seaward as
appropriate.
.10 Ship to ship activity means any activity not related to the port facility that
involves the transfer of goods or persons from one ship to another
.11

Designated

Authority

means

the

organization

(s)

or

the

administration(s)identified, within the Contracting Government, as responsible for
ensuring the implementation of the provisions of this chapter pertaining to port
facility security and ship7port interface, from the point of view of the port facility
.12 International ship and port facility security ISPS code means the
international code for the security of ships and port facilities consisting of Part A (the
provisions of which shall be treated as mandatory) and Part B (the provisions of
which shall be treated as recommendatory) as adopted, on 12th December 2002 by
resolution 2 of the Conference of Contracting Government to the International
Convention on the Safety of Life at sea 1974 as may be amended by the
Organization, provided that:
.1 amendments to Part A of the code are adopted, brought into force and take
effect in accordance with article V111 of the present Convention concerning
amendment procedures applicable to the annex other than this chapter; and
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.2 amendments to Part B of the code are adopted by the Maritime Safety
Committee in accordance with its rules of procedure.
.13 Security incident means any suspicious act or circumstance threatening
the security of a ship, including a mobile drilling unit and a high speed craft, or a port
facility or of any ship/port interface or any ship to ship activity.
.14 Security level means the qualification of the degree of risk that an incident
will be attempted or will occur.
.15 Declaration of security means an agreement between a ship and either a
port facility or another ship with which it interfaces specifying the security measures
each will implement.
.16 Recognised security organization means an organization with appropriate
expertise in security matters and with the appropriate knowledge of ship and port
operations authorised to carry out assessment or a verification or an approval or a
certification activity, required by this chapter or part A of the ISPS code.
2 The term “ship”, when used in regulations 3 to13, includes mobile offshore drilling
units and high speed craft.
3 The term “all ships” when used in this chapter means any ship to which this
chapter applies.
4The tern Contracting Government when used in regulations 3, 4, 10, 11, 12and13
includes reference to the “Designated Authority

Regulation 2
Application
1 This chapter applies to:
.1the following types of ships engaged on international voyages:
.1.1passenger ships, including high-speed passenger craft;
.1.2 cargo ships, including high speed craft, of 500 gross tonnage and
upward; and
.1.3 mobile offshore drilling unit; and
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.2 port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages.
3

Notwithstanding the provision of paragraph 1.2,Contracting Governments
shall decide the extent of application of this chapter and of the relevant
sections of Part A of the ISPS code to those port facilities within their
territory which, although used primarily by ships not engaged on international
voyages, are required, occasionally, to serve ships arriving or departing on an
international voyage.
(a) Contracting Governments shall base their decision under
paragraph 2 on port facility security assessment carried out
in accordance with the provision of part A of the ISPS code.
(b) Any decision which a Contracting Government makes,
under paragraph 2 shall not compromise the level of security
intended to be achieved by this chapter or Part A of the ISPS
code.

4

This chapter does not apply to warships, naval auxiliaries or other ships
owned or operated by Contracting Government and used only on Government
non-commercial service.

5

Nothing in this chapter shall prejudice the right or obligation of states under
the international law
Regulation 3
Requirements of Contracting Governments with respect to
security

1 Administrations shall set security levels and ensure the provision of information to
the ships entitled to fly their flag. When changes in security level occur, security
information shall be updated as the circumstances dictates.
2 Contracting Government shall set security levels and ensure the provision of
security information to port facilities within their territory and ships prior to entering
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a port or whilst in a port within their territory. When changes in security occur,
security level information shall be updated as the circumstances dictates.
Regulation 4
Requirements for the companies and ships
1 Companies shall comply with the relevant requirements of this chapter and of part
A of the ISPS code, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISP code.
2 Ships shall comply with the relevant requirement of this chapter and part A of the
ISPS code, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS code, and
such compliance shall be verified and certified as provided for in part A of the ISPS
code.
3 Prior to entering a port or whilst in a port within the territory of a Contracting
Government, a ship shall comply with the requirements for the security level set by
the Contracting Government, if such level is higher than the security level set by the
Administration for that ship.
4 Ships shall respond without delay to any change to a higher security level.
6

When a ship is not in compliance with the requirements of this chapter or of
the part A of the ISPS code or cannot comply with the requirement for the
security level set by the Administration or by another Contracting
Government and applicable to the ship, then the ship shall notify the
appropriate competent authority prior to conducting any ship/port interface or
prior to entry into port, whichever occurs earlier.
Regulation 5
Specific responsibilities of companies

The company shall ensure that the master has available on board, at all times,
information through which officers duly authorised by a Contracting Government
can establish:
.1 who is responsible for appointing the members of the crew or other persons
currently employed or engaged onboard the ship in any capacity on the business of
that ship;
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.2 who decides the employment of the ship; and
.3 in cases where the ship is employed under the terms of charter party (ies), who are
the parties to such charter party (ies)
Regulation 6
Ships security alert system
1 All ships shall be provided with a ship security alert system as follows:
.1 ships constructed on or after 1st July 2004;
.2 passenger ships, including high speed craft, constructed before 1st July
2004, not later than the first survey of the radio installation after 1st July2004
.3 oil tankers chemical tankers gas tankers bulk carriers and cargo high speed
craft, of 500 gross tonnage and upward constructed before 1st July 2004, not later
than the first survey of the radio installation after 1st July 2004; and
.4 other cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upward and mobile offshore
drilling units constructed before 1st July 2004, not later than the first survey of the
radio installation after 2006
2 The ship security alert when activated, shall:
.1 initiate and transmit a ship to shore security alert to a competent authority
designated by the Administration, which in these circumstances may include the
company, identifying the ship, its location and indicating that the security of ship is
under threat or it has been compromised;
.2 not send the ship security alert to any other ship;
.3not to raise any alarm on board the ship; and
.4 continue the ship security alert until deactivated and or reset.
3 The ship security alert system shall:
.1 be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and in at least one
other location; and
.2 conform to performance standards not inferior to those adopted by the
Organization.
7

The ship security alert system activation point shall be designed so as to
prevent the inadvertent initiation of the ship security alert.

103

8

The requirement of a ship security alert system may be complied with by
using radio installation fitted for compliance with the requirement of chapter
1V, provided that all requirements of this regulation are complied with.

9

When an Administration receives notification of a ships security alert the
Administration shall immediately notify the state(s) in the vicinity of which
the ship is presently operating

10 When a Contracting Government receives notification of a ship security alert
from a ship which is not entitled to fly its flag, that Contracting Government
shall immediately notify the relevant Administration and, if appropriate the
state(s) in the vicinity of which the ship is presently operating.
Regulation 7
Threat to ships
1 Contracting Governments shall set security levels and ensure the provision of
security information to the ships operating in their territorial sea or having
communicated an intention to enter their territorial sea.
2 Contracting Governments shall provide a point of contact through which such ships
can request for advice or assistance and to which such ships can report any security
concerns about other ships, movements or communications.
Where a risk of attack has been identified, the Contracting Government concerned
3 shall advice the ships concerned and their Administrations of:
.1 the current security level;
.2any security measures that should be put in place by the ships concerned to protect
themselves from attack, in accordance with the provisions of part A of the ISPS
code; and
.3 security measures that the coastal state has decided to put in place, as appropriate
Regulation 8 security
Masters discretion for the ship safety and
1 The master shall not be constrained by the company, the charterer or any other
person from taking or executing any decision, which, in the professional judgement
of the master, is necessary to maintain the safety and security of the ship. This
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includes denial of access to persons (except those identified as duly authorised by the
Contracting Government) or their effects and refusal to load cargo including
containers or other closed cargo transport units.
2 If, in professional judgement of the master, a conflict between any safety and
security requirements applicable to the ship arises during its operations, the master
shall give effect to those requirements necessary to maintain the safety of the ship. In
such cases, the master may implement temporary security measures and shall
forthwith inform the Administration and, if appropriate, the Contracting Government
in whose port the ship is operating or intends to enter. Any such temporary security
measures under this regulation shall, to the highest possible degree be commensurate
with the prevailing security level. When such cases are identified, the Administration
shall ensure that such conflicts are resolved and that the possibility of recurrence is
minimal.
Regulation 9
Control and compliance measures
1 Control of ships in ports
1.1 For the purpose of this chapter, every ship to which this chapter applies is subject
to controls when in a port of another Contracting Government by officers duly
authorised by that Government, who may be the same as those carrying out the
functions of regulation 1/19. Such control shall be limited to verifying that there
is on board a valid International Ship Security Certificate or a valid Interim
International Ship security certificate issued under the provisions of part A of the
ISPS code (certificate, which if valid shall be accepted, unless there are clear
grounds for believing that the ship is not in compliance with the requirement of
this chapter or the ISPS code.
1.2 When there are such clear grounds, or whereon valid certificate is produced when
required, the officers duly authorised by the Contracting Governments shall
impose any one or more control measures in relation to that ship as provided in
paragraph1.3.Any such measures imposed must be appropriate, taking into
account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.
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1.3 Such control measures are as follows: inspection of the ship, delaying the ship,
detention of the ship, restriction of operations including movement within the
port or expulsion of the ship from the port. Such control measures may
additionally or alternatively include other lesser administrative and corrective
measures.
2

Ship intending to enter a port of another Contracting Government

2.1 For the purpose of this chapter, a Contracting Government may require that ships
intending to enter its ports provide the following information to officers duly
authorised by that Government to ensure compliance with this chapter prior to
entry into port with the aim of avoiding the need to Impose control measures or
steps:
.1 that the ship possesses a valid certificate and the name of the issuing authority;
.2 the security level at which the ship is currently operating;
.3 the security level at which the ship operated in any previous port where it has
conducted a ship/port interface within the timeframe specified in paragraph 2.3;
.4 any special or additional security measures that were taken by the ship in any
previous port where it had conducted a ship/port interface within the timeframe
specified in paragraph 2.3
.5 that the appropriate ship security procedures were maintained during a ship-toship activity within the timeframe specified in paragraph 2.3
.6 other practical security related information (but not the details of the ship
security plan) taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.
If requested by the Contracting Government, the ship or the company shall provide
confirmation, acceptable to that Contracting Government, of the information required
above.
2.2 Every ship to which this chapter applies intending to enter the port of another
Contracting Government shall provide the information described in paragraph
2.1on request of the officers duly authorised by that Government. The master
may decline to provide such information on the understanding that failure to do
so may result to denial of entry into port.
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2.3 The ship shall keep records of the information referred to in paragraph 2.1 for the
last 10 calls at port facilities.
2.4 If, after receipt of the information described in paragraph 2.1,officers duly
authorised by the Contracting Government of the port in which the ship intends
to enter have clear grounds for believing that the ship is in non compliance with
the requirements of this chapter or part A of the ISPS Code, such officers shall
attempt to establish communication with and between the ship and the
Administration in order to rectify the non compliance. If such communication
does not result in rectification or if such officers have clear grounds otherwise for
believing that the ship is in non compliance with this chapter or part A of the
ISPS Code, such officers may take steps in relation to that ship as provided in
paragraph 2.5.Any such steps must be proportionate taking into account the
guidance given in part B of the ISPS Code.
2.5 Such steps are as follows:
.1 a requirement for rectification of the non compliance;
.2 a requirement that the ship proceed to a location specified in the territorial sea
or internal waters of that Contracting Government;
.3 inspection of the ship, if the ship is in territorial sea of the Contracting
Government the port of which the ship intends to enter; or
.4 denial of entry into port.
Prior to initiating any such steps, the ship shall be informed by the Contracting
Government of its intentions. Upon this information the master may withdraw the
intention to enter the port. In such cases, this regulation shall not apply.
3

Additional provisions

3.1 In the event:
.1 of imposition of a control measure, other than a lesser administrative or
corrective measure referred to in paragraph 1.3; or
.2 any steps referred to in paragraph 2.5 are taken,
an officer duly authorised by the Contracting Government shall forthwith inform in
writing the Administration specifying which control measures have been imposed or
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steps taken and the reasons thereof. The Contracting Government imposing the
control measures or steps shall also notify the recognised security organization,
which issued the Certificate relating to the ship concerned and the Organization
when any such control measures have been imposed or steps taken
3.2 When entry into port is denied or the ship is expelled from port, the authorities of
the port state should communicate the appropriate facts to the authorities of the
state of the next appropriate ports of call, when known, and any other appropriate
coastal states, taking into account guidelines developed by the Organization.
Confidentiality and security of such notification shall be ensured.
3.3 Denial of entry into port, pursuant to paragraphs 2.4 and 2.5 or expulsion from
the port pursuant to paragraph 1.1 and 1.3 shall only be imposed where the
officers duly authorised by the Contracting Government have clear ground to
believe that ship poses an immediate threat to the security or safety of persons or
of ships or other property and there are no other appropriate means for removing
that threat.
3.4 The control measures referred to in paragraph 1.3 and the steps referred to in
paragraph2.5 shall only be imposed, pursuant to this regulation, until the no
compliance giving rise to the control measures or steps has been corrected to the
satisfaction of the Contracting Government, taking into account actions proposed
by the ship or the Administration, if any.
3.5 When Contracting Governments exercise control under paragraph 1 or steps
under paragraph 2:
.1 all possible efforts shall be made to avoid a ship being unduly detained or
delayed. If a ship is thereby unduly detained or delayed, it shall be entitled to
compensation for any loss or damage suffered; and
.2 necessary accesses to the ship shall not be prevented for emergency or
humanitarian reasons and for security purposes
.
Regulation 10
Requirements for port facilities
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1 Port facilities shall comply with the relevant requirements of this chapter and
part A of the ISPS Code, taking into account the guidance given in part B of the ISPS
Code.
2 Contracting Governments with port facility or port facilities within their
territories, to which this regulation applies, shall ensure that:
.1 port facility security assessments are carried out, reviewed and approved in
accordance with the provisions of part A of the ISPs Code; and
.2 port facility security plans are developed, reviewed, approved and
implemented in accordance with the part A of the ISPS Code.
Contracting Governments shall designate and communicate the measures required to
be addressed in a port facility security plan for the various security levels, including
when the submission of Declaration of Security will be required.
Regulation 11
Alternative security agreements
1 Contracting Governments may, when implementing this chapter and part A of the
ISPS Code, conclude in writing bilateral or multilateral agreements with other
Contracting Governments on alternative security arrangements covering their
international voyages on fixed routes between port facilities located within their
territories
2 Any such agreements shall not compromise the level of security of other ships or of
the port facilities not covered by the agreement.
3No ship covered by such an agreement shall conduct ship-to-ship activity with any
ship not covered by the agreement.
4Such agreement shall be reviewed periodically, taking into account the experience
gained as well as any changes in the particular circumstances or the assessed threats
to the security of the ships, the port facilities or the route covered by the agreement.
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Regulation 12
Equivalent security arrangements
1 An Administration may allow a particular ship or a group of ships entitled to fly its
flag to implement other security measures equivalent to those prescribed in this
chapter or the part A of the ISPS Code, provided such security measures are at least
as effective as those prescribed in this chapter or the part A of the ISPS Code. The
Administration, which allows such security measures, shall communicate to the
Organization particulars thereof.
2 When implementing this chapter and part A of the ISPS Code, a Contracting
Government may allow a particular port facility or a group of port facilities located
within their territory, other than those covered by an agreement concluded under
regulation 11, to implement security measures equivalent to those prescribed in this
chapter or part A of the ISPS Code, provided such security measures are at least as
effective as those prescribed in this chapter or part A of the ISPS Code. The
Contracting Government, Which allows such security, shall communicate to the
Organization particulars thereof.
Regulation 13
Communication of information
The Contracting Governments shall, not later than 1 July 2004, communicate to the
Organization and shall make available for the information of the companies and
ships:
.1the name and contact details of their national authority or authorities
responsible for ship and port facility security;
.2the locations within their territory covered by the port facility security plans
.3the names and contact details of those who have been designated to be
available at all times to receive and act upon the ship to shore security alert, referred
to in regulation 6.2.1
.4the names and contact details of those who have been designated to be
available at all times to receive and act upon any communication from Contracting
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Governments exercising control and compliance measures referred to in regulation
9.3.1: and
.5 the names and contact details of those who have been designated to be
available at all times to provide advice or assistance to ships and to whom ships can
report any security incident concern referred to in regulation 7.2;
and thereafter update such information as and when changes relating thereto occur.
The Organization shall circulate such particulars to other Contracting Governments
for the information of their officers.
2 Contracting Governments shall, not later than 1 July 2004, communicate to the
Organization the names and contact details of any recognised security organizations
authorised to act on their behalf together with details of the specific responsibility
and conditions of the authority delegated to such organizations. Such information
shall be updated as and when changes relating thereto occur. The organization shall
circulate such particulars to other Contracting Governments for information of their
officers.
4

Contracting Governments shall, not later than 1 July 2004, communicate to the
organization a list showing the approved port facility security plans for the port
facilities located in their territory together with the location or locations covered
by each approved port facility security plan and the corresponding date of
approval and thereafter shall further communicate when any of the following
changes take place:
.1 changes in the location or locations covered by an approved port
facility security plan are to be introduced or have been introduced. In
such cases the information to be communicated shall indicate the
changes in the location or locations covered by the plan and the
corresponding date as of which such changes are to be introduced or
implemented;
.2 an approved port facility security plan, previously included in the
list submitted to the Organization, is to be withdrawn or has been
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withdrawn. In such cases, the information to be communicated shall
indicate the date on which the withdrawal will take effect or was
implemented. In these cases, the communication shall be made to the
Organization as soon as practicably possible; and
.3 additions are to be made to the list of approved port facilities
security plans. In such cases, the information to be communicated
shall indicate the location or locations covered by the plan and the
date of approval.
4

Contracting Governments shall, at five years interval after 1 July 2004,
communicate to the Organization a revised and updated list showing all the
approved port facility security plans for the port facilities located within their
territory together with the location or locations covered by each approved
port facility security plan and corresponding date of approval (and the date of
approval of any amendments thereto) which will supersede and replace all
information communicated to the Organization pursuant to paragraph 3
during the preceding five years.

5

Contracting Governments shall communicate to the Organization information
that an agreement under regulation 11 has been concluded. The information
communicated shall include:

.1 the names of the Contracting Governments which have concluded the
agreement;
.2 the port facilities and the fixed routes covered by the agreement;
.3 the periodicity of review of the agreement;
.4 the date of entry into force of the agreement; and
.5 information on any consultations, which have taken place with other,
contracting Governments.
And thereafter shall communicate, as soon as practicably possible, to the
Organization information when the agreement has been amended or has ended.
6Any Contracting Government, which allows, under the provision of regulation
12, any equivalent security arrangements with respect to a ship entitled to fly its
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flag or in respect to a port facility located within its territory, shall communicate
to the Organization the particulars thereof.
7 The Organization shall make available the information communicated under
paragraph 3 to other Contracting Governments upon request.
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